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Terror on the High Seas 
THE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS 
OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY MEASURES 
Marjorie Florestal† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It really boggles my mind that there could be 40,000 nuclear 
weapons, or maybe 80,000, in the former Soviet Union, poorly 
controlled and poorly stored, and that the world isn’t in a near state 
of hysteria about the danger. 
—Howard Baker, U.S. Ambassador to Japan1 
  
 † Marjorie Florestal is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of the 
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law (B.A., J.D. New York University).  The author 
expresses deep appreciation to the colleagues and friends who sat through numerous 
discussions on what they once considered an obscure topic.  In particular, heartfelt 
appreciation to Raj Bhala, Andrea Bjorklund, and Peggy McGuinness for insightful 
comments on an earlier draft of this work; Ruth Jones, Thom Main, Greg Pingree, Kojo 
Yelpaala, and participants in the McGeorge faculty works in progress helped the 
author shape these ideas, and the able intervention of some wonderful research 
assistants was critically important to the success of this work—particular thanks to 
Antonia Badway who shepherded this project through its very early stages.  Lee 
Sheldon subsequently took up the mantle with assistance from Nicole Sargent and 
Lindsey Read.  This article was supported by a McGeorge Summer Research Fund. 
 1 Testimony of Howard Baker before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, quoted in Graham Allison, Fighting Terrorism – By Invitation – Could 
Worse Be Yet to Come?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2001, available at http://www.economist. 
com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=842483.  In fact the world—and  certainly the 
United States—is very concerned with the possible implications.  U.N. Resolution 1540 
“[a]ffirm[s] that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as 
their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security” and 
goes on to prohibit states in aiding or abetting non-state actors from acquiring such 
weapons.  S.C. Res. 1540 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (April 28, 2004) [hereinafter 
Resolution 1540]. The resolution also directs states to establish effective domestic 
controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass 
destruction.  Id.  In addition, in 2003, President Bush announced the establishment of 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”), which would seek international 
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Shipping containers are the new frontline in the War on 
Terror.  Before September 11, 2001, the innocuous forty by 
eighty foot steel structures were seen as nothing more than 
floating boxes meant to transport goods from country of 
production to country of consumption.2  If Americans gave any 
thought to the millions of containers that find their way to U.S. 
shores each year, at best, they imagined that within their 
narrow, windowless confines were several tons of used clothes 
bound for the Dominican Republic, or perhaps toys imported 
from China.  Few would have considered, even for a moment, 
the possibility that a shipping container could house an Al-
Qaeda terrorist.  But only one month after the September 11 
attacks, Italian officials intercepted Rizik Amid Farid, an 
Egyptian national and reputed Al-Qaeda member, in a 
container bound for Canada.3  Farid carried with him a 
Canadian passport, along with several airport security passes, 
and an aircraft mechanic certificate that allowed him entry 
into sensitive areas in New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport, as 
well as Newark International, Los Angeles International and 
Chicago-O’Hare.4   
  
agreements allowing the United States and its allies to interdict planes and ships 
suspected of transporting nuclear cargo or weapons of mass destruction.  ARMS 
CONTROL ASS’N, THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) AT A GLANCE (Sept. 
2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI.asp.  For a description of the 
initiative and its impact in Asia, see Mark J. Valencia, The Proliferation Security 
Initiative: Making Waves in Asia (Int’l Inst. for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 
376, 2005). 
 2 Containers come in lengths of ten, twenty, thirty, and forty feet long by 
eight feet wide, but the most common containers are the twenty- and forty-foot 
varieties.  Construction-Guide.com, Matthew Bendert, Cargo Containers, 
http://www.construction-guide.com/ cargo-containers.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006). 
 3 PHILLIPE CRIST, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY IN MARITIME TRANSPORT: RISK FACTORS AND ECONOMIC 
IMPACT 8-9 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/13/4375896.pdf 
[hereinafter OECD REPORT].  See also Andrea Felsted & Mark Odell, Al-Qaeda: After 
Afghanistan; Agencies Fear Extent of Al-Qaeda’s Sea Network, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 
2002, available at http://specials.ft.com/attackonterrorism/FT3U47PPYXC.html.  
Lawyers for Rizik Amid Farid deny that he was ever part of any terrorist organization, 
claiming that he stowed away in a shipping container because “he had personal 
problems in Egypt that made him flee that country.”  Egyptian Stowaway Had 
Canadian Passport, CBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2001, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/ 
2001/10/25/stowaway_farid011025.html.  When released from an Italian prison, Farid 
disappeared.  OECD REPORT, supra, at 8.  See also Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Customs 
Comm’r, Speech Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 17, 2002), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/ 
commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2002/jan172002.xml [hereinafter Bonner 
Jan. 2002].  
 4 OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.  See also Felsted & Odell, supra note 3.  
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How could the enemy so easily infiltrate the most 
important link in the global trade supply chain?5  Experts 
believe without the intermodal shipping container—standard-
sized steel boxes that can be hoisted onto a ship as a single unit 
and transported by sea, rail, and truck—globalization would 
not have been possible.6  Before the invention of the shipping 
container, goods were individually loaded onto a ship piece by 
piece in “break bulk,” an expensive process that often took days 
to complete and subjected goods to theft or breakage.7  
“Containerization” did for maritime shipping what Henry 
Ford’s assembly line did for the automobile manufacturing 
industry, largely automating the loading and unloading 
process, thus making the system faster, more efficient, and cost 
effective.8 But the very attributes of “the box”—its speed, 
efficiency, and above all its anonymity—are what allowed Farid 
  
 5 The “enemy” has long infiltrated the maritime transportation industry.  
Since Captain Blackbeard roamed the Caribbean Sea striking fear in the hearts of 
sailors and merchants alike, maritime trade has had a long and colorful history of 
criminal activity.  For a discussion of Blackbeard’s exploits, see generally JEAN DAY, 
BLACKBEARD, TERROR OF THE SEAS (1997).  While current threats to the international 
trade supply chain go far beyond piracy, the profession is not dead.  See generally INT’L 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST 
SHIPS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT (2006).  Most recently, passengers on a cruise ship bound 
for Mombassa, Kenya found themselves in the midst of an all-out pirate attack.  Cruise 
Ship Repels Somali Pirates, BBC NEWS, INT’L VERSION, Nov. 5, 2005, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4409662.stm.  In 2003, The International Maritime Bureau Piracy 
Reporting Centre, a non-governmental organization under the auspices of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, reported that 445 ships were attacked by pirates.  
See PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, supra, at 5.  The Malacca Strait and 
the area around Sumatra and Indonesia pose the greatest risks of piratical attacks.  
See Paul Dillon, Did Tsunamis Ruin Pirates of Sumatra?, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 25, 
2005, at A1.  Of the 100,000 ships that sail through those waters carrying half of the 
world’s oil supplies and one-third of all its cargo, 149 were subjected to pirate attacks 
in 2003.  See PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, supra, at 5.  Perhaps the 
only bright spot from the devastating 2004 Tsunami in Asia was the short-lived respite 
in pirate attacks in the region.  See Dillon, supra, at A1. 
 6 For a history of containers and their impact on world trade, see generally 
MARC LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD 
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER (2006); see also Ron Adner, High 
Technology and Strategy Project: Containers – Revolutionizing Global Transport, June 
9, 2002, at 16, available at http://faculty.insead.fr/adner/PREVIOUS/Projects%20May/ 
Container%20Project.pdf.   
 7 Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of 
the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism, 18 AM. U. INT.’L L. REV. 341, 347 (2002) (citing 
MARK L. CHADWIN ET AL., OCEAN CONTAINER TRANSPORTATION 1 (1990)). 
 8 Malcolm McLean is credited with inventing the containerization process in 
1956.  See Mellor, supra note 7, at 347-48.  See also All Things Considered: Shipping 
Containers in Seattle (NPR radio broadcast May 15, 2001), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1122981.  Despite the impact of 
his invention, McLean died in relative obscurity.  See Barry Rascovar, Shipping 
Pioneer Largely Ignored, BALT. SUN, June 14, 2001, at 23A. 
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to bypass security safeguards.  Those same characteristics have 
made shipping containers the new frontline in the War on 
Terror. 
Over 90% of world trade moves by container.9  But only 
about 2% of the nearly nine million containers entering the 
United States each year are ever inspected.10  For the most 
part, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”)—the 
agency charged with protecting the nation’s land and sea 
borders—has no firsthand knowledge of what is being 
transported in those containers.11  It must rely on the 
unverified information shippers provide in their cargo manifest 
documents.12  This largely self-regulated system has seen a 
number of security breaches: In 1999, the Interagency 
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports reported 
that containers have been used to smuggle into the United 
States everything from drugs to illegal arms and munitions to 
undocumented workers.13  More recently, scientist Abdul 
Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, confessed 
to smuggling nuclear equipment and technology to Libya, Iran 
and North Korea in a smuggling network that spanned fifteen 
  
 9 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Fact Sheet (Mar. 29, 2006) at 2, available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/ 
cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_fact_sheet.ctt/csi_fact_sheet.doc 
[hereinafter CSI Fact Sheet].  See also Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3. 
 10 Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3.  See also, OECD REPORT supra note 3, at 
7.  The amount of container traffic to the United States is expected to more than double 
over the next two decades.  Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-295, § 101, 116 Stat. 2064, 2066 (2002). 
 11 The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency is far more comprehensive 
than the former U.S. Customs Service.  As a result of the World Trade Center attacks, 
on March 1, 2003, all immigration inspectors, agricultural inspectors, and the border 
patrol merged to form one agency, under the Department of Homeland Security, with 
exclusive authority to patrol and manage U.S. borders.  See Robert C. Bonner, U.S. 
Customs Comm’r, Remarks of Commissioner Robert C. Bonner: 2003 Liner CEO 
Forum (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/ 
speeches_statements/archives/2003/apr01003.xml [hereinafter Bonner 2003]. 
 12 See Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3. 
 13 The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports 
concluded that drug smuggling was the most prevalent reported crime, with the twelve 
seaports participating in the study reporting that between 1996-1998, narcotics seized 
constituted 69% of total weight of cocaine, 55% of marijuana, and 12% of heroin. The 
smuggling of illegal aliens was the second-most prevalent problem, with the twelve 
participating seaports reporting 1187 stowaways and 247 individuals with fraudulent 
documents arriving aboard vessels between 1996 and 1999 alone.  Finally, cargo 
theft—often conducted by organized crime figures—was identified as the third-most 
prevalent problem, accounting for between $6 billion and $12 billion of direct losses 
annually.  S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Port and Maritime 
Security Act of 2001, S. 1214, 107th Cong. (2002); S. REP. NO. 107-64, at 5 (2001) 
[hereinafter Port and Maritime Security Act]. 
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years.14  Khan purportedly shipped all of his nuclear materials 
inside containers.15  
The seemingly obvious solution to the security risk 
posed by shipping containers is to increase the number of 
inspections. Why not inspect 100% of the containers arriving in 
the United States?  If Customs was to adopt such a policy, the 
supply chain16 would grind to a halt, trailing global economic 
catastrophe in its wake.17  In a “just-in-time” world—where 
businesses purchase and accept delivery of products as needed 
rather than buying them in advance and incurring expensive 
warehousing and other storage costs—the slightest delay in the 
delivery of goods leads to significant economic loss.18  In 2002, a 
  
 14 In a televised confession, Khan admitted selling nuclear material and 
begged for clemency.  Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan, BBC NEWS, INT’L EDITION, Feb. 20, 
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3343621.stm. See also Global 
Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction: A.Q. Khan, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ 
world/pakistan/khan.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).  
 15 Christian Caryl, The Box Is King, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Apr. 10 2006 (citing 
former U.S. State Department official David Asher), available at http://www.msnbc. 
msn.com/id/12112804/site/newsweek.  Examples such as Farid and Khan are only the 
tip of the iceberg.  In recent years, terrorist organizations have begun to use the 
maritime industry in novel and sophisticated ways to advance their objectives.  A 
number of terrorist groups are reported to own maritime fleets that conduct both 
legitimate and shadowy activities to generate profits.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamile 
Eelam (LTTE), a guerilla force at war with the Sri Lankan government since the 
1980s, is perhaps the most engaged in the shipping industry, with a profitable fleet 
estimated at ten to twelve freighters.  See OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.  Al 
Qaeda also owns or controls a fleet of fifteen cargo vessels.  See John Mintz, 15 
Freighters Believed to Be Linked to Al Qaeda, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2002, at A1. 
 16 A “supply chain” generally is defined as a network of retailers, distributors, 
transporters, storage facilities, and suppliers that participate in the sale, delivery, and 
production of a particular product.  See Supply-Chain Council, Supply-Chain.Org: FAQ, 
http://www.supply-chain.org/cs/root/about_us/faq (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). 
 17 In addition to the costs imposed by 100% inspection, some experts argue 
that it would amount to no more than a waste of time and effort.  See Alane Kochems & 
James Jay Carafano, One Hundred Percent Cargo Scanning and Cargo Seals: Wasteful 
and Unproductive Proposals, The Heritage Foundation (May 5, 2006), http://www. 
heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm1064.cfm (noting that “[i]nspecting every 
container that is shipped to the U.S. makes no sense.  Doing so would cost billions of 
dollars and drown authorities in useless information.  Moreover, it is not clear why 
every container would require inspection.  The ‘nuke-in-a-box’ scenarios deployed to 
justify such drastic measures are highly implausible.”).  Despite that, CBP appears to 
be moving towards a 100% inspection model.  As a result of the Security and 
Accountability for Every Port Act, signed into law October 13, 2006, CBP has directed 
additional resources to the nation’s busiest port—Los Angeles-Long Beach—to ensure 
that by January 2007, 100% of container traffic exiting the port by truck and rail will 
be screened for nuclear and radiological materials.  Press Release, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, SAFE Ports LA/Long Beach Style:  CBP Shows Off High-Tech 
Equipment to Detect Radiological Weapons (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ 
newsroom/news_releases/112006/11022006.xml (statement of Commissioner W. Ralph 
Basham). 
 18 The U.S automobile industry is a case in point.  After the borders reopened 
within just days of the September 11 attacks, the backlog of container traffic was so 
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ten-day strike by West Coast area dock workers was estimated 
to cost the U.S. economy as much as $1 billion a day,19 
ultimately leading the President to invoke federal authority to 
order strikers back to work.20  And a mere two-day delay in 
shipments after the September 11 attacks nearly crippled the 
U.S. automobile industry.21 Moreover, merely increasing the 
number of inspections would not lead to greater security.  
Without sufficient information to target specific containers, 
Customs would be searching for the proverbial needle-in-the-
haystack—at great economic cost. 
But if September 11 revealed the tragic gaps in airport 
security, when those two airplanes hit the World Trade Center 
it also forced Customs officials to acknowledge holes in the 
maritime trade security infrastructure.  If a shipping container 
could house an Al Qaeda operative, could it also hold a “dirty 
bomb”?22 Could a terrorist stow a nuclear device in a container, 
ship it to one of the nation’s busiest ports, and then detonate 
that device by remote control upon arrival?  The “nuke-in-a-
box” scenario, which would have seemed far-fetched before 
September 11, now drives U.S. container security policy.  Just 
four months after the attacks, Customs adopted the 
controversial Container Security Initiative (“CSI”), describing 
it in this way: 
  
severe that it caused enormous delays in auto-parts shipments from Canada and 
Mexico, which in turn jeopardized the industry’s financial position and threatened to 
lead to plant closings and massive layoffs.  See Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3.  As the 
war on terrorism heats up, U.S. companies are purchasing products further in advance 
of what is needed (just-in-case inventory).  One expert estimates the increased 
inventory holding could add $50 to $80 billion in U.S. costs and wipe away 
approximately half of the productivity gains the U.S. has achieved in the past ten 
years.  OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 18 (citing Donald Bowserbox & David Closs, 
Supply Chain Sustainability and Cost in the New War Economy, TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 
1, 2002). 
 19 Press Release, White House, President Takes Action to Protect America’s 
Economy and Jobs (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2002/10/20021007-3.html.  See also U.S. Won’t Cite Either Side in Dock 
Dispute, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A31.  Underscoring the difficulty of quantifying 
economic losses in the maritime industry, the figures on losses generated by the West 
Coast strike vary widely.  Some experts discount the $1 billion a day figure and peg 
losses at less than $500 million per day for the total ten-day lock-out period.  See 
Patrick L. Anderson, Lost Earning Due to the West Coast Port Shutdown: Preliminary 
Estimate 1 (Anderson Econ. Group LLC, Working Paper No. 2002-10, 2002).   
 20 David E. Sanger, President Invokes Taft-Hartley Act to Open 29 Ports, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at A1. 
 21 Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3.  Ironically, after the September 11 
attacks, only a few critical ports were closed in the New York area and the general 
container trade was not significantly impacted.  OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. 
 22 A “dirty bomb” is one “made of nuclear materials wrapped around 
conventional explosives.”  Felsted & Odell, supra note 3. 
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Imagine if a weapon of mass destruction sitting in a container within 
the sea cargo environment were detonated.  This program helps keep 
that from happening.23 
Designed to “extend the zone of security outward,” CSI’s 
central premise is that American seaports and borders must 
become the last line of defense and not the first.24  In short, by 
the time a nuclear device hidden in a shipping container laden 
with Chinese footwear finds its way into a U.S. port, it is 
already too late.  CSI is meant to prevent just such an 
occurrence.25  Rather than waiting until the container arrives 
in the United States, CSI shifts security and screening 
activities to the border of the exporting country. With the host 
  
 23 Slide Presentation, CSI, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Response to 
Terrorism, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_ 
activities/csi/csirev_1002.ctt/standard_current_generic_csi.ppt [hereinafter Slide 
Presentation]. 
 24 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks of Tom Ridge at the Port 
of Newark, New Jersey (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ 
display?content=960 [hereinafter Ridge]. 
 25 CSI was not the only security measure to be adopted post-September 11.  
To protect America’s ports, ships and cargo, the United States adopted a “layered” 
security system featuring a separate but related latticework of over twenty-five laws, 
regulations and initiatives, including both voluntary and mandatory measures, and 
affecting both domestic and international participants.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
SECURE SEAS, OPEN PORTS: KEEPING OUR WATERS SAFE, SECURE AND OPEN FOR 
BUSINESS 3-4 (June 21, 2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
DHSPortSecurityFactSheet-062104.pdf: 
  Figure 1: Layers of Port and Maritime Security – Post-September 11 
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government’s permission,26 Customs agents are posted in the 
foreign port where they inspect “high risk” containers bound for 
the United States before they ever leave the foreign port.27 
In principle, CSI began as no more than a voluntary 
program by which Customs, through a series of bilateral 
agreements, obtains authorization from some of the United 
States’ top trading partners to deploy personnel abroad in 
order to prevent a catastrophe at home.28  But in practice, CSI 
is a “hidden revolution”29 that has radically altered the way 
international maritime trade is conducted, and it has 
transformed the world trade system.  The effect of CSI has 
been to favor some trading partners over others, creating clear 
winners and losers.  Opting to implement the program in three 
  
 26 Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3.  CSI teams are not legally authorized, 
however, to inspect containers on their own but must seek permission from the host 
government to inspect any shipments.  If permission is not granted, the shipment is 
sent to the United States without inspection, although CSI teams are required to place 
a domestic hold on the shipment, so that it will be inspected upon arrival at its U.S. 
destination.  A recent report by the Government Accountability Office has found that, 
in at least a few instances, some containers which CSI teams had labeled “high-risk” 
but which host government officials had not permitted to be inspected in-country were 
also not inspected upon arrival in the United States.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-05-466T, HOMELAND SECURITY: KEY CARGO SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BE 
IMPROVED 4 (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05466t.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT, May 2005] (statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues). 
 27 In a reciprocal program, CSI authorizes participating countries to post 
their own officials at U.S. borders.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-770, 
CONTAINER SECURITY: EXPANSION OF KEY CUSTOMS PROGRAMS WILL REQUIRE 
GREATER ATTENTION TO CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 10 n.10 (July 2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03770.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT 2003].  Canada 
and Japan have posted officials to the United States.  Id.  While CSI’s critical 
innovation is that it moves inspection of high-risk containers to a much earlier point in 
the overall process, the program incorporates three additional components: 
(1) Establish security criteria to identify those containers that are considered “high-
risk”; (2) Use non-intrusive equipment such as radiation, gamma, and x-rays to quickly 
pre-screen high-risk containers; and (3) Develop secure and “smart” devices that could 
detect any tampering with the container that might have occurred en route.  Bonner 
Jan. 2002, supra note 3. 
 28 While CSI began as an initiative of Customs—taken under its own 
authority—on October 13, 2006, President Bush signed into law The Port Security 
Improvement Act of 2006, which codified the program.  The move toward codification 
appeared to be an effort on the part of Congress to actively manage the port security 
issue.  Jeff Berman, Bush Signs Off on New Port-Security Legislation, LOGISTICS 
MGMT., Oct. 1, 2006, available at http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/ 
CA6382237.html?stt=000&pubdate=10%2F01%2F2006 (“As certain programs 
like . . . CSI go toward increasing cooperation between the government and shippers, 
we make them a product of statutory authority, as opposed to just a program of the 
administrations. . . .  We put the imprimatur of the Congress on it . . . .” (quoting Rep. 
Dan Lungren)). 
 29 Caryl, supra note 15 (quoting Former Coast Guard Captain, Stephen 
Flynn). 
2007] TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 393 
stages,30 Customs initially excluded from CSI membership all 
but the top twenty “megaports”—those ports that send the 
largest volume of container traffic to the United States.31  In 
Phase II of the project, ports of political or strategic 
significance are permitted membership in CSI provided they 
meet certain criteria.32  Only in Phase III will ports that require 
  
 30 Bonner 2003, supra note 11. 
 31 The top twenty megaports account for over 70% of the maritime container 
traffic to the United States.  Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Customs Comm’r, Remarks of U.S. 
Customs Comm’r Robert C. Bonner: Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/ 
speeches_statements/archives/2002/aug262002.xml [hereinafter Bonner Aug. 2002].  
By June 2003, nineteen of the top twenty ports had agreed to implement CSI, and CBP 
Commissioner Bonner along with Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge were able 
to announce Phase II of CSI.  Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
Secretary Ridge Announces Security Initiatives Phase II (June 12, 2003), available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/cbp_press_releases/0620
03/06122003_2.xml. 
  Currently, there are fifty-one operational CSI ports throughout the world: 
Africa (1): 
South Africa (1). 
Asia (17): 
Singapore (1), Japan (4), Hong Kong (1), South Korea (1), Malaysia 
(2), Thailand (1), UAE (1), China (4), Sri Lanka (1), Oman (1). 
Europe (24):  
The Netherlands (1), Germany (2), Belgium (2), France (2), Sweden 
(2), Italy (5), United Kingdom (5), Greece (1). Spain (3), Portugal 
(1). 
The Americas (9): 
Canada (3), Brazil (1), Argentina (1), Honduras (1), The Dominican 
Republic (1), Jamaica (1), The Bahamas (1). 
Ports in CSI – CBP.gov, Currently Operational Ports (Sept. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/ports_in_csi.xml 
[hereinafter Ports in CSI]. 
 32 To participate in CSI a candidate nation must commit to the following 
minimum standards: 
The Customs Administration must be able to inspect cargo originating, 
transiting, exiting, or being transshipped through a country. 
Non-intrusive inspectional (NII) equipment (including gamma or X-ray 
imaging capabilities) and traditional detection equipment must be available 
and utilized for conducting such inspections.  The equipment is necessary in 
order to meet the objective of quickly screening containers without disrupting 
the flow of legitimate trade. 
The seaport must have regular, direct, and substantial container traffic to 
ports in the United States.  
Commit to establishing a risk management system to identify potentially 
high-risk containers, and automating that system.  This system should 
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technical assistance and capacity building—those ports in 
developing countries—be considered for CSI membership.33   
Membership in CSI comes with tangible benefits, the 
most significant of which is the ability to move through 
Customs with little delay.  Given these benefits, exporters are 
more likely to source from countries with CSI-certified ports.  
In fact, that appears to be a deliberate design of the program; 
Customs admits that “[i]n the event of a terrorist attack, the 
CSI ports would have a competitive advantage.  They would be 
rewarded for their foresight.”34   
CSI’s “hidden revolution” has impacted the world, but 
the effect of the measure is perhaps more deeply felt at the 
margins.  Given CSI’s staggered implementation schedule, 
along with the conditionalities imposed on membership, most 
developing countries become eligible to participate years after 
the program has been implemented in developed countries’ 
ports.  Moreover, even if they are eligible, many of the poorer 
developing countries do not have the resources and technical 
know-how to implement CSI’s requirements (indeed, at least 
one developed country is finding implementation beyond its 
capacity).35  The developing country perspective is virtually 
  
include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting 
decisions and identifying best practices. 
Commit to sharing critical data, intelligence, and risk management 
information with the United States Customs service in order to do 
collaborative targeting, and developing an automated mechanism for these 
exchanges. 
Conduct a thorough port assessment to ascertain vulnerable links in a port’s 
infrastructure and commit to resolving those vulnerabilities. 
Commit to maintaining integrity programs to prevent lapses in employee 
integrity and to identify and combat breaches in integrity. 
CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 3. 
 33 While Phase III has not been officially announced, CBP has begun to 
incorporate some developing countries into the CSI program.  As of September 2006, 
CSI was operational in ports in Kingston, Jamaica, Freeport, The Bahamas and 
Caucedo, the Dominican Republic.  Ports in CSI, supra note 31.  CSI also added ports 
in Buenos Aires, Argentina and Puerto Cortes, Honduras.  Id. 
 34 CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 4. 
 35 Greece, a CSI participant, member of the European Union, and host of the 
2004 Summer Olympics, did not have the requisite technology.  In a departure from 
standard procedure, the United States supplied the necessary technology on loan.  See 
GlobalSecurity.org, Greece Signs Container Security Agreement with U.S., June 25, 
2004, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2004/06/sec-
040625-usia01.htm [hereinafter Greece Signs Agreement].  CSI requires that 
participating members have the requisite non-intrusive inspectional equipment (NII), 
including gamma and x-rays, in place.  See also CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 3 
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ignored in the balance the United States has struck between 
protecting its borders and ensuring the efficacy of the maritime 
trade supply chain.  For developing countries, exclusion from 
CSI creates a formidable non-tariff barrier to trade, further 
entrenchment of existing trading patterns that favor the rich, 
and greater marginalization of preference programs like the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act, all of which are likely to 
have severe consequences for their development agendas.   
Beyond the impact on developing countries, CSI also 
poses a significant dilemma for the trading system. Terrorism 
is the single greatest threat facing the multilateral system in 
the twenty-first century, yet CSI’s unilateral approach 
bypasses the multilateral system altogether.  By opting for a 
“go it alone” strategy—working with just a few like-minded 
states—rather than seeking to build a broad-based coalition of 
countries to address the problem, the United States is 
effectively undermining multilateralism.36  If the multilateral 
system is ineffective in dealing with the greatest challenge 
today, then its ultimate demise is inevitable.  Given that the 
multilateral trading system has effectively advanced U.S. 
interests in a number of areas, undermining the system by 
choosing a unilateral approach ultimately jeopardizes U.S. 
interests.   
In the face of terrorist threats, the idea that the United 
States would take measures to protect its ports and the 
maritime trade supply chain is not surprising, particularly 
given the importance of the system and the enormity of the 
crisis a successful attack would precipitate.  The critical 
question, therefore, is not should the United States take action, 
but rather how should the United States implement such 
action so as to maximize protection of domestic security 
interests while minimizing potential economic harm to both the 
United States and its trading partners.   
This article analyzes CSI and argues that the program’s 
discriminatory and unilateral approach will ultimately prove 
detrimental to developing countries, U.S. security interests, 
and the multilateral trading system as a whole.  Part II 
evaluates CSI within the context of U.S. international 
obligations, arguing that CSI violates the non-discrimination 
  
(“Does CBP provide X-ray or gamma ray detection technology to help scan containers?  
CSI implementation requires the host country to have NII equipment.”). 
 36 For a more detailed discussion of the unilateral/bilateral approach, see 
infra, section III.A. 
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requirement of GATT Article I, and it is not justified by the 
national security exception of GATT Article XXI because it fails 
to consider the impact on development. Part III concludes with 
a prescription for a more development-friendly measure that 
balances the need for domestic security with the development 
objectives of the trading system’s most vulnerable members.   
II. A UNILATERAL APPROACH TO A MULTILATERAL 
PROBLEM:  CSI AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
It is by now cliché to assert that September 11, 2001 has 
changed the face of U.S. society.  Confronted with the single 
greatest terrorist37 catastrophe ever to hit American soil, the 
United States responded in ways that have had enduring 
effects both at home and abroad.  Domestically, legislation like 
the USA Patriot Act38 reversed long-cherished notions of the 
law’s role in regulating government’s interaction with the 
accused.  A body of law that once championed the rights of 
criminal defendants has now given way to notions of “enemy 
combatants” and indefinite detentions without charge or access 
to legal counsel.39  And internationally, the United States’ 
  
 37 Defining terrorism is a complex endeavor, and it has often been said that 
“one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”  Boaz Ganor, Defining 
Terrorism:  Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism (ICT), available at http://www.ictconference.org/var/119/17070-
Def%20Terrorism%20by%20Dr.%20Boaz%20Ganor.pdf.  U.S. law defines terrorism as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.”  22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2004 & 
Supp. 2006).  But by that measure, the U.S. also labeled as “terrorism” efforts of the 
African National Congress (ANC) to liberate South Africa from the tyranny of a racist 
minority regime.  From the Irish Republican Army to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization to the ANC, governments have long sought to delegitimize armed dissent, 
even in the face of popular support for the combatants or the “justness” of the 
liberation struggle.  While coming to an accepted definition of terrorism is beyond the 
scope of this article, few would dispute that the perpetrators of September 11—
targeting as they did unarmed, non-combatant civilians—engaged in acts of terrorism.  
For further discussion of the dangers inherent in defining terrorism, see Ganor, supra 
(noting that “[t]he statement, ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,’ 
has become not only a cliché, but also one of the most difficult obstacles in coping with 
terrorism. . . .  In the struggle against terrorism, the problem of definition is a crucial 
element in the attempt to coordinate international collaboration, based on the 
currently accepted rules of traditional warfare.”). 
 38 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), was passed one 
month after the World Trade Center attacks with little debate and by an overwhelming 
margin in both houses of Congress (Senate:  98-1; House: 357-66).  See 147 CONG. REC. 
S11060 (2001); 147 CONG. REC. H7224 (2001). 
 39 For a critique of U.S. domestic measures in the face of terrorism, see David 
D. Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. 
 
2007] TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 397 
posture shifted from one focused on building strong 
international institutions to combat common problems to one 
championing pre-emptive war and shying away from 
institution-building for fear that those same institutions would 
be turned against American interests.40  In short, in the 
aftermath of September 11, the U.S. worldview swung from 
multilateral cooperation to a go-it-alone strategy or at best a 
bilateral approach—a “coalition of the willing”—working with 
only a handful of like-minded states.   
No aspect of U.S. foreign policy escaped this new 
approach.  Even in the international trade arena, where 
multilateralism has brought decisive benefits to the American 
  
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (arguing that the United States has not learned the 
lessons of the McCarthy Era, and any decline in the traditional forms of repression are 
“more than offset” by the development of new ones).  
 40 The United States’ position regarding the creation of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) presents perhaps the starkest example of America’s move away 
from multilateralism and institution-building.  From President Woodrow Wilson’s 
League of Nations to the post-World War II efforts of Roosevelt, Truman and 
Eisenhower to create the United Nations and the multinational economic institutions 
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the United States had been 
at the forefront of international institution-building.  But with respect to the ICC, one 
Bush Administration official noted baldly, “[It] is an organization whose precepts go 
against fundamental American notions of sovereignty, checks and balances, and 
national independence.  It is an agreement that is harmful to the national interests of 
the United States, and harmful to our presence abroad.”  John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y 
for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., The United States and the International Criminal 
Court, Remarks to the Federalist Society (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.state. 
gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm.  Rather than championing the fledgling institution, the United 
States renounced its signature of the Rome Statute of the ICC and negotiated a 
number of bilateral agreements—so-called Article 98 agreements—whereby signatory 
states agreed not to submit U.S. citizens to the jurisdiction of the court.  U.S. 
Communication to the United Nations (May 6, 2002), available at http://untreaty. 
un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp.  For a 
discussion of these Article 98 agreements and their legal impact, see Chet J. Tan, Jr, 
The Proliferation of Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements Among Non-Ratifiers of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1115 (2004). 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute provides: 
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic 
immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first 
obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is 
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court 
can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent 
for the surrender. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 98, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/9.htm. 
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economy, the United States has acted unilaterally to combat 
the scourge of terrorism.41  CSI is illustrative of that general 
trend.  The following section explores whether CSI conforms to 
U.S. obligations under the World Trade Organization.  It first 
examines CSI in the context of Article I of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).  Maintaining that 
CSI likely violates Article I, the section goes on to determine 
whether the national security exception of GATT Article XXI 
provides a viable excuse for the derogation.   
A. Does CSI Violate Article I’s Most Favored Nation 
Obligation? 
When the United States proposed creation of the 
International Trade Organization, the still-born precursor to 
the GATT, the very idea that the world trade community could 
be ordered in a non-discriminatory fashion—that members 
would be bound by the same obligations and entitled to the 
same benefits—was the height of controversy.42  The history of 
trading relations up until 1946 was one in which advantages 
were bestowed or compelled through special relationships, 
economic duress, and even war.43  The bold declaration of non-
discrimination inherent in GATT Article I was a call to 
reinvent the status quo ante.44  In this new world order, 
  
 41 In recent days, it appears the Bush Administration is re-thinking its “go it 
alone” strategy.  See, e.g., David E. Sanger, A Bush Alarm: Shun Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 2006, at A1 (“The president who made pre-emption and going it alone the 
watchwords of his first term is quietly turning in a new direction, warning at every 
opportunity of the dangers of turning the nation inward and isolationist, and making 
the case for international engagement on issues from national security to global 
economics.”).  
 42 For a discussion of the negotiations on the ultimately unsuccessful 
International Trade Organization, see generally CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD 
TRADE (1949). 
 43 See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 42 (1970) (stating that “[t]he United States had made 
elimination of all preferences a major principle of its policy for post-war organization of 
world trade”). 
 44 To be sure, Article I does not eliminate all discrimination recognizing as it 
does the preferential relationships between some countries and their former colonies.  
See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, sec. II, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ 
gatt47.pdf [hereinafter GATT] (allowing pre-existing preferences for inter alia, “two or 
more territories which . . . were connected by common sovereignty or relations of 
protection or suzerainty”).  In addition, GATT-WTO law allows for a number of waivers 
of the MFN obligation, including a waiver to provide for “differential and more 
favourable treatment” to developing countries.  Decision on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, ¶ 
1, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203-05 (1980).  Other waivers 
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preference-based trading relationships would give way to an 
all-for-one-and-one-for-all system of trading.  Almost single-
handedly,45 the United States persuaded those nations 
represented in the GATT negotiations to adopt non-
discrimination—or “most favored nation” treatment—as the 
cornerstone obligation of the new, rules-based system of 
trading.46  While the United States was one of the earliest 
champions of non-discriminatory trading relationships,47 the 
  
of the MFN obligation can be found in GATT Article XXIV’s sanction of regional 
trading agreements—free trade areas and customs unions—which necessarily 
discriminate in favor of their members; and of course, the general exceptions of the 
GATT embodied in Articles XX and XXI constitute waivers of the MFN obligation. 
 45 As early as 1941, before the end of World War II, Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt met secretly off the coast of Newfoundland  
to chart the course of the new world order.  “There they jointly agreed that the 
principle of multilateralism would be the cornerstone of an emergent international 
economic system.”  See Daniel Drache, The Short but Significant Life of the 
International Trade Organization: Lessons for Our Time 8 (Ctr. for Canadian Studies, 
Working Paper No. 62/00, 2000).  British support for the ITO and the new order had 
been purchased by the large amount of economic support the Americans had pledged 
for post-war reconstruction.  Id.  Despite that, British support for the principle of MFN 
was lukewarm at best, as they sought American agreement that discrimination “of a 
defined and moderate degree in favour of a recognised political or geographical 
grouping of states would be permitted,” primarily to preserve “a moderate degree of 
Imperial Preference.”  JOHN TOYE & RICHARD TOYE, THE U.N. AND GLOBAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: TRADE, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 24 (2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
  For the other participants not beholden to American financing, the 
objections to MFN were particularly vociferous—and sometimes even amusing:  The 
Russian delegation contended that MFN was “a device of the devil to ensnare and 
enslave small countries,” and the Latin American contingent eschewed MFN in favor of 
a preference-based system that self-consciously took into consideration the interests of 
developing countries: 
[W]ealth and income . . . should be redistributed between the richer and the 
poor states.  Upon the rich, obligations should be imposed; upon the poor, 
privileges should be conferred.  The former should recognize it as their duty 
to export capital for the development of backward areas; the latter should not 
be expected . . . to insure the security of such capital, once it was obtained.  
The former should reduce barriers to imports; the latter should be left free to 
increase them.  The former should sell manufactured goods below price 
ceilings; the latter should sell raw materials and food stuffs above price 
floors.  Immediate requirements should be given precedence over long-run 
policies, development over reconstruction, and the interests of regionalism 
over world economy.  Freedom of action, in the regulation of trade, must be 
preserved. The voluntary acceptance by all states, of equal obligations with 
respect to commercial policy must be rejected as an impairment of 
sovereignty and a means by which the strong would dominate the weak. 
WILCOX, supra note 42, at 32. 
 46 See DAM, supra note 43, at 42 (noting that “[t]he United States had made 
elimination of all preferences a major principle of its policy for the post-war 
organization of world trade.”). 
 47 Over time, U.S. support for MFN has been somewhat mercurial.  It has 
itself circumvented MFN’s precept, including its refusal in the 1950s to extend MFN 
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Container Security Initiative bestows on some WTO members 
certain advantages not afforded to others, thereby calling into 
question its conformity with Article I.48   
Article I:1 of the GATT provides in relevant part:  
[W]ith respect to all rules and formalities in connection with 
importation and exportation, . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any Member to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other Members.49 
The core obligation of Article I can be summed up in the idea 
that “membership has its privileges”; by virtue of its 
membership in the WTO, a country is entitled to receive the 
same treatment—or at least treatment “no less favorable”—for 
its imports as that received by other WTO members.50  The 
prototypical example of the operation of most favored nation 
(“MFN”) treatment involves tariffs.  Imagine this scenario:  The 
United States, France and South Africa, all of whom are WTO 
members, are engaged in a series of protracted (and 
undoubtedly heated) negotiations over the tariff duty rate to be 
  
treatment to communist countries.  JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW 
AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1997).  But for a long time, 
preference programs that would discriminate in favor of developing countries came 
under considerable fire in U.S. trade circles.  Such programs were seen as 
impermissible departures from the MFN principle.  See id.  See also ROBERT E. HUDEC, 
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL 
SYSTEM (1993) [hereinafter HUDEC, ENFORCING TRADE LAW]. 
 48 While beyond the scope of this article, CSI may well violate other 
provisions of the WTO Agreement, including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade.  South Africa, before it was admitted to CSI, appeared to make such an 
argument.  See Business Report, U.S. Customs, U.S. Plan Could Hurt Trade, July 22, 
2002, available at http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=407 [hereinafter 
Business Report] (quoting a South African official stating “[t]he US initiative could be 
discriminatory against the exports of developing countries and could be in breach of 
World Trade Organisation rules. While acknowledging the US’s security concerns 
behind this initiative, we are concerned that these should not be a license for unilateral 
actions which unduly restrict trade.”).  Moreover, even if U.S. action does not violate 
the WTO agreement, non-CSI members may potentially raise a non-violation 
nullification and impairment claim.  But see Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the 
Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 558, 615-
17 (1990) (arguing that a non-violation claim is inappropriate if the measure taken is 
consistent with GATT Article XXI); see also GATT Panel Report, United States-Trade 
Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶ 4.9, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986) [hereinafter U.S.-Trade 
Measures Affecting Nicaragua] (declining to examine non-violation claim because there 
were no remedies available under the circumstances if Nicaragua were to prevail).   
 49 GATT, supra note 44 (emphasis added). 
 50 Report of the Panel, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (May 31, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-
Autos]. 
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imposed on imports of bottled water into the United States.  
After much heated discussion, South Africa and the United 
States manage to come to an agreement that would lower the 
tariff from 10% to 5%.  Negotiations between the French and 
the Americans break down.  MFN treatment nonetheless 
requires the immediate and unconditional extension of the 5% 
duty rate to French bottled water imports. Moreover, even 
WTO members who chose not to participate in the negotiations 
at all—for example, Italy—would be entitled to the same 
benefits.51  
The MFN obligation is not restricted to customs duties 
or charges.  It also includes the obligation to refrain from 
discriminating among WTO members with respect to any 
advantage, including domestic regulations, such as CSI.52  To 
successfully establish a violation of MFN, three elements must 
be satisfied:  First, there must be an “advantage” of the type 
covered by Article I; second, that advantage must not be 
accorded to the “like product” of all WTO Members; and third, 
that advantage must not be granted to members “immediately 
and unconditionally.”53   
An “advantage” in the WTO context is broadly defined.54 
The advantages conferred by CSI membership are both 
economic and political in scope.  The greatest economic benefit 
to participants is the ability to move through the shipping 
process with little fear that containers will be stopped or 
delayed at the U.S. border.  Once containers from CSI ports 
pass inspection in-country, they are usually not re-examined 
  
 51 For a general discussion of MFN, see RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW: A 
TREATISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENT OF TARIFFS AND TRADE (2005).  For a 
discussion on the historical evolution of MFN, see Edward A. Laing, Equal 
Access/Non-Discrimination and Legitimate Discrimination in International Economic 
Law, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 246, 255-64 (1996). 
 52 GATT Article I:1 also provides: 
[A]nd with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 
III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting 
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in 
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties. 
GATT, supra note 44. GATT Article III:2 refers to taxes while GATT Article III:4 refers 
to domestic regulations.  Id. 
 53 Report of the Panel, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile 
Industry, ¶ 14.138, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998). 
 54 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 206, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) 
(noting that a “broad definition has been given to the term ‘advantage’ in Article I:1 of 
the GATT 1994”). 
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upon entry to a U.S. port.55  In a “just-in-time” world, the 
ability to navigate the trade supply chain with a minimum of 
delay is a significant competitive advantage—even a single 
day’s delay at Customs adds almost 1% to the cost of goods.56  
CSI ports therefore immediately obtain “preferred” status, and 
countries that do not have CSI-certified ports are at a 
competitive disadvantage given the likelihood that their 
shipments will undergo more complex examinations and will 
thus be cleared more slowly.   
Beyond the immediate fast-track benefit, CSI 
membership also serves as an “insurance policy.”  Should the 
unimaginable happen and a terrorist attack is successfully 
implemented against the maritime trade supply chain, CSI 
ports would likely not be shut down at all, whereas shipments 
from all other ports would not be allowed entry into the United 
States.57  Even if the maritime transportation sector had to be 
shut down completely, CSI-certified ports would begin handling 
containerized cargo far sooner than other ports.58  The 
implications for the economies of CSI and non-CSI-certified 
countries are enormous.59  Ultimately, CSI-certification gives a 
strategic business advantage to some ports over others; all 
other things being equal, shippers who wish to continue 
exporting to the United States are induced to ship from CSI 
ports. 
In addition to the economic benefits, CSI membership 
also confers a significant political advantage to participants.  
While a “voluntary” program, CSI is nevertheless a cornerstone 
of the U.S. War on Terror.  Few countries, even Germany and 
France,60 are willing to be seen as obstructionist or non-
  
 55 Ridge, supra note 24.   
 56 WORLD BANK REPORT, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE 
DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA 198 (2004), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext.pdf 
[hereinafter Global Economic Prospects]. 
 57 Bonner Aug. 2002, supra note 31. 
 58 CSI Fact Sheet 6, supra note 9, at 2-3.  
 59 After the French tanker Limburg was attacked in Yemen, underwriters 
immediately tripled premiums for vessels calling on Yemeni ports (as much as 
$300,000 per vessel).  Some lines cut Yemen altogether from their schedules and 
switched to neighboring ports, resulting in massive layoffs at Yemeni terminals (as 
many as 3000 people) and losses totaling $15 million per month.  Despite the 
government’s efforts to retain business by putting in place a loss guarantee program, 
shippers fled Yemen.  OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 17. 
 60 Both German and French ports signed bilateral CSI agreements with the 
United States.  Initially, their cooperation appeared costly when the European Union 
Commission decided to bring infringement action against all EU member states that 
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cooperative.61 Along with the big stick, however, comes a 
tantalizing carrot:  CSI members are seen as “partners” in the 
War on Terror, and as such are entitled to special treatment.  
For example, the United States loaned Greece the equipment 
necessary to implement CSI despite the fact that CSI requires 
a potential member to own the requisite equipment before it 
can be considered for membership.62  And certainly Pakistan is 
a poster child for the tangible benefits that accrue to 
cooperative partners in the War on Terror.63 
Membership in CSI thus brings substantial benefits.  
For those left out of the system, the costs of being on the 
frontlines of the War on Terror without a shield are 
considerable.64  While CSI membership is no protection against 
economic losses stemming from an actual terrorist attack,65 its 
benefit on the front-end of the transaction—as a perceived 
“insurance policy”—is enormous.  Exporters are more likely to 
utilize CSI-certified ports based on their assumption that those 
  
had signed CSI agreements, alleging they had no such authority.  The Commission 
subsequently dropped the proceedings after entering into an EU-wide CSI agreement 
with the United States.  Container Security, European Union Factsheet, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_03/cs.pdf [hereinafter EU 
Factsheet].   
 61 Evidence of the inability of most countries to “just say no” to U.S. 
antiterrorism initiatives can be found in how quickly CSI was implemented.  Former 
Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner noted that while placing U.S. officials in a 
foreign country usually would have been a slow and difficult process, CSI moved from 
concept to implementation at “lightening [sic] speed.”  Bonner Aug. 2002, supra note 
31.  Unfortunately, the speed with which CSI was rushed in place did not allow for 
proper evaluation.  The GAO noted that Customs implemented the program without 
even having a way to measure whether they were successful in that respect—whether 
CSI gave them any greater capabilities than they had before.  GAO REPORT 2003, 
supra note 27, at 26.  
 62 See Greece Signs Agreement, supra note 35. 
 63 After securing Pakistan’s cooperation in the War on Terror, the United 
States adopted a number of provisions to reward the country for its efforts.  See, e.g., 
Pakistan Emergency Economic Development and Trade Support Act, S. 1675, 107th 
Cong. § 2 (2001) (authorizing the President to reduce or suspend duties on Pakistani 
textiles imports if he determines, among other things, that Pakistan is incurring 
“substantial economic harm” as a direct consequence of its assistance in the War on 
Terror).  See also Pub. L. No. 107-57, 115 Stat. 403 (authorizing the President to waive 
with respect to Pakistan U.S. legal prohibitions on providing direct assistance to a 
country whose “duly elected head of government was deposed by decree or military 
coup”). 
 64 Yemen’s experience after a devastating terrorist attack is illustrative.  See 
supra note 59 and sources cited therein. 
 65 Indeed, globalization means countries suffer economically even when they 
have not faced attack.  Even countries that are not directly involved in a terrorist event 
may expect their incomes to decline; one post-September 11 study found that decline 
could amount to $75 billion per year as a result of a 1% ad valorem increase in 
“frictional” (i.e., transactional) trade costs.  Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, 
at 186. 
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ports are less likely to face a terrorist attack in the first place, 
and in any case they would be first in line when the supply 
chain reopens after an attack.  This provides a considerable 
competitive advantage to CSI member countries.  Recognizing 
the distortions to trade CSI engenders, the European Union 
(“EU”) Commission brought infringement proceedings against 
eight member states that signed individual agreements with 
the United States.66   In the Commission’s view, CSI jeopardizes 
the common commercial policy by distorting competitive 
conditions among EU ports.67  In short, the EU Commission 
considered CSI to create unhealthy competition among EU 
ports by causing shippers to divert trade from non-CSI ports to 
ports within the program.68  Ultimately, to avoid the trade-
distorting impact of CSI, the Commission signed its own CSI 
agreement with the United States, which made all EU ports 
eligible for membership.69  
The CSI advantage is not granted to the “like product” 
of all WTO member countries.  Defining “like product” under 
GATT Article I is a challenging exercise.70  Perhaps the 
  
 66 EU Factsheet, supra note 60. 
 67 Id.  The top eight European ports handle 85% of Europe’s containerized 
cargo bound for the United States.  Id.  
 68 The New Zealand government appears to have reached a similar 
conclusion—to avoid any competitive disadvantage to its ports, New Zealand is 
reportedly working towards negotiating a nation-to-nation agreement with the United 
States.  See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Container 
Security: Major Initiatives and Related International Developments, 
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2004/1 (Feb. 26, 2004), at 22 [hereinafter UNCTAD Report], 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20041_en.pdf. 
 69 The U.S.-E.U. Agreement provides “[p]articipation of Community ports in 
the Container Security Initiative is necessary to avoid significant barriers to large 
volumes of transatlantic trade with the United States resulting from customs control 
measure in US ports.”  Agreement between the European Community and the United 
States of America on Intensifying and Broadening the Agreement of 28 May 1997 on 
Customs Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in Custom Matters to Include Co-
operation on Container Security and Related Matters, Explanatory Mem. para. 2, Jan. 
22, 2004 [hereinafter U.S.-E.U. Agreement].  The Annex provides that “[r]ecognizing 
that expansion of CSI should occur as quickly as possible for all ports within the 
European Community where exchange of sea-container traffic with the United States 
of America is more than de minimis and where certain minimum requirements are met 
and where adequate inspection technology exists.”  Id. 
 70 It is perhaps not surprising given the inherent difficulty in determining 
with specificity, for example, whether dry-roasted Costa Rican coffee is “like” un-
roasted Venezuelan coffee.  Moreover, it is in the “like product” analysis that countries 
so inclined find the best opportunity for hidden discrimination.  For example, imagine 
that the United States wishes to disfavor Venezuela for its political and economic 
policies and wants to favor Costa Rica as a counterpoint dominant actor in the region.  
Some Customs official could be asked to analyze the imports of the respective countries 
and imagine that it was discovered that Venezuela shipped dry roasted coffee beans 
and Costa Rican exported un-roasted.  The U.S. might well charge a higher tariff on 
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simplest way to conceive of it—to borrow an idea from one 
trade scholar—is to think of “likeness” as a continuum, with 
“identical” merchandise at one end of the spectrum and 
“different” merchandise at the other end; in between would be 
products that are “similar.”71  The easiest analysis, not 
surprisingly, is at the edges:  Different products are not 
entitled to MFN treatment, while identical products are.  Thus, 
the United States may assess one duty rate on unprocessed 
cocoa imports from the Ivory Coast and another on chocolate 
bars from Belgium because those products are “different.”  
Imports of raw cocoa from both countries are “identical” and 
would thus be subject to the same duty.  The difficulty lies with 
“similar” products.  Are imports of sweetened, ground and 
processed cocoa from Belgium like ground cocoa from the Ivory 
Coast?  The short answer is that it depends.72   
Much of the wealth of GATT-WTO “like product” 
jurisprudence is irrelevant in evaluating CSI’s conformity with 
Article I, however.  CSI does not discriminate on a product-
specific but on a country-specific basis.  In other words, in 
treating shipments from CSI ports better than shipments from 
non-CSI ports, CSI discriminates based on the origin of the 
product rather than on the product itself.  Thus, the question 
becomes whether origin-based discrimination is permissible 
under GATT Article I.  The seminal case on this point is 
Belgian Family Allowances.73  
In 1951, Belgium found itself brought before a GATT 
dispute settlement panel.  Denmark and Norway objected to a 
Belgian-imposed tax on imports purchased by local government 
  
dry roasted and argue that the products are not “like” because they are not classified 
under the same tariff heading, for example.  See Report of the Panel, Spain – Tariff 
Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, L/5135 (Apr. 27, 1981), GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) 
(1981) [hereinafter Spain Tariff].  See also Report of the Panel, Treatment by Germany 
of Imports of Sardines, ¶ 12, G/26 (Oct. 30, 1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 57 
(1953) [hereinafter German Sardines]. 
 71 BHALA, supra note 51, at 7. 
 72 In GATT jurisprudence, a determination of “likeness” is made after taking 
into account such factors as physical characteristics and consumer preference.  See, 
e.g., Spain Tariff, supra note 70.  See also German Sardines, supra note 70.  For a 
discussion of the policy dimensions of Article I’s like product requirement, see Robert 
E. Hudec, “Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in 
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE 
LAW 101-23 (Thomas Cottier & Petros Mavroidis, eds., 2000), reproduced at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudeclikeproduct.pdf. 
 73 Report of the Panel, Belgian Family Allowances (allocations familiales), 
G/32 (Nov. 7, 1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 59-62 (1963) [hereinafter Belgian 
Family]. 
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bodies.74  The purpose of the tax was to provide a broad revenue 
base to fund Belgium’s family allowance program (a 
government social welfare benefit program).  Rather than 
imposing the tax on all imports, Belgium exempted from the 
program products from countries that had a family allowance 
regime similar to its own.  Denmark and Norway had family 
allowance programs in place and sought such an exemption, 
but were denied.  While both countries maintained that the 
discrimination lay only in Belgium’s failure to exempt them 
from application of the tax, the panel appeared to go one step 
further, concluding that Belgium’s legislation was “based on a 
concept which was difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the 
General Agreement.”  What did the “spirit” of GATT require? 
[T]he Belgian legislation would have to be amended insofar as it 
introduced a discrimination between countries having a given 
system of family allowances and those which had a different system 
or no system at all, and made the granting of the exemption 
dependent on certain conditions.75   
Although the panel did not arrive at a definitive ruling, 
it concluded the Belgian legislation was inconsistent with the 
provisions of Article I.  Apparently, neither the panel nor 
GATT members found this to be a conceptually difficult case.76  
John H. Jackson, one of the leading scholars in the field, 
characterized Belgian Family Allowances as follows:  
The case can be interpreted to support the proposition that although 
treatment can differ if the characteristics of goods themselves are 
different, differences in treatment of imports cannot be based on 
differences in characteristics of the exporting country that do not 
result in differences in the goods themselves.77 
Applying the panel’s determination in Belgian Family 
Allowances to an evaluation of CSI, one is led to the ultimate 
conclusion that the difference in treatment of developing 
country imports is not based on any inherent differences in the 
products themselves.  Developing countries are not being 
  
 74 ROBERT HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 
135 (2d ed. 1990).  For an analysis of whether Hudec got it right, see generally Steve 
Charnovitz, Belgian Family Allowances and the Challenge of Origin-Based 
Discrimination, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 7 (2005). 
 75 Belgian Family, supra note 73, at 60. 
 76 The entire process from referral to the panel to the adoption of the panel 
report took nine days.  The panel’s report was adopted with little discussion.  See 
Charnovitz, supra note 74. 
 77 JACKSON, supra note 47, at 163. 
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treated differently because their exports of bananas, lumber or 
textiles are inherently more of a security risk.  Rather, they 
face different treatment because Customs has made the 
determination initially to limit CSI membership to those 
countries of strategic and economic significance to the United 
States.  Thus, the differing treatment afforded CSI and non-
CSI goods has little to do with differences in the goods being 
exported—i.e., Customs has not made the determination 
(except perhaps implicitly) that goods from non-CSI members 
are inherently more of a security risk than goods from CSI 
members.78  Goods from CSI and non-CSI countries face 
different treatment merely because Customs constructed an 
implementation schedule that was administratively 
convenient.   
The CSI advantage is not accorded “immediately and 
unconditionally” to the like product of all other WTO 
members.79  Not every interested country is permitted to join 
CSI.  In the first phase of implementation, membership was 
restricted to the top twenty megaports, which send the largest 
volume of container traffic to the United States.  Phase II of the 
project targets ports that are of political or strategic 
significance.80  These ports are asked to join CSI only if they 
satisfy certain minimum standards, the most important of 
which include having “regular, direct and substantial” 
container traffic to the United States and having the requisite 
non-intrusive inspectional equipment available.81  Merely 
satisfying some of the criteria for membership does not, 
however, guarantee inclusion in CSI.  For example, Mexico 
apparently sought membership only to be denied because it did 
not have sufficient container traffic to the United States.82  
Similarly, Jamaica’s port security system appeared to meet CSI 
  
 78 There is an argument to be made that goods of developing countries are not 
“like products” because they are not subjected to the same domestic security controls as 
are goods from CSI members.  In short, the assumption is that poorer countries devote 
less resources to port, container and customs’ security measures.  That is, of course, 
merely an assumption.  Some developing countries have excellent controls.  See, e.g., 
Arlene Martin-Wilkins, Jamaica’s Port Security Procedures to Be Used as World 
Benchmark, JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 21, 2005, available at http://www. 
jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050620t220000-0500_82811_obs_jamaica_s_port_ 
security_procedures_to_be_used_as_world_benchmark.asp. 
 79 Canada-Autos, supra note 50. 
 80 CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Trade Policy Review, Mexico Question & Answer, WT/TPR/M/97/Add.1 
(June 11, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm.   
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requirements, but it was not admitted into CSI until 
September 2006, several years after the program became 
operational.83  Developing countries for the most part are 
excluded from CSI in the first two phases of implementation.  
While a tiny minority of ports in developing countries 
participate in CSI—Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and South Africa to 
name a few—only in Phase III are significant numbers of 
developing country ports considered for CSI membership.84   
Thus, CSI would appear to violate Article I because it 
confers benefits on some members that are not immediately 
and unconditionally made available to all WTO members.  It 
would be difficult to forget that CSI was implemented in the 
face of a pervasive fear of terrorist attack on the most 
important—and perhaps most vulnerable—link in the trade 
supply chain.  Having concluded that CSI violates a central 
tenet of the WTO Agreement, it does not automatically follow 
that the multilateral system is ill-equipped to deal with 
terrorism.  The GATT was crafted in a time of war, and its 
authors and signatories were well aware of the need for trade 
rules to give way to security measures.  It would have been 
short-sighted indeed if the GATT had not contemplated and 
made provisions for the situation where a member would have 
to act to protect its national security interests, even if that 
meant violating the provisions of a trade agreement.   
The next section maintains that the WTO Agreement 
does enable countries to deal with the single greatest threat 
facing the world in the twenty-first century.  GATT Article XXI 
recognizes and explicitly authorizes members to take action 
that would otherwise be inconsistent with their WTO 
obligations if such actions are taken to protect their “essential 
security interests.”  Implicit in Article XXI, however, is the 
recognition of a “development dimension.”  What does this 
development dimension entail? Can CSI be justified in light of 
it?   
  
 83 See Martin-Wilkins, supra note 78.  The United States signed a 
Declaration of Principle with Jamaica in June 2006, and by September 2006, Jamaica’s 
Kingston port was included in CSI.  See Container Security Initiative Coming to 
Jamaica: Innovative CBP Program Screens Cargo for Dangerous Materials Before 
Arriving in U.S. (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ 
newsroom/news_releases/062006/06202006_2.xml; see also Ports in CSI, supra note 31. 
 84 It is not clear when Phase III implementation will begin.  While Customs 
has recently admitted a handful of developing countries in CSI, it has not officially 
announced commencement of Phase III.  See Ports in CSI, supra note 31.  
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B. Justifying CSI Under the National Security Exception 
The Charter is long and complicated and difficult. . . .  But we must 
not lose sight, in all of its detail, of the deeper problems that 
underlie these mysteries.  For the questions with which the Charter 
is really concerned are whether there is to be economic peace or 
economic war, whether nations are to be drawn together or torn 
apart, whether men are to have work or to be idle, whether their 
families are to eat or go hungry, whether their children are to face 
the future with confidence or with fear. 
—Honorable William L. Clayton85  
No provision of international law or the WTO 
Agreement itself prevents a country from taking measures 
necessary to protect its own security interests.  National 
security is the “Achilles’ heel of international law.”86  In any 
international agreement, “the issue of national security gives 
rise to some sort of loophole . . . [allowing] any nation-state to 
protect itself . . . by employing otherwise unavailable means.”87   
From its inception, GATT recognized the “Achilles’ heel” 
of national security would require trade rules to be 
subordinated to national security considerations.  Article XXI 
was thus adopted as a general exception allowing members to 
derogate from any and all of their obligations in specific 
instances of national security.  But the text of Article XXI has 
led to a great deal of controversy.  While it unequivocally states 
that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . to 
prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests,”88 the language of Article XXI nevertheless presents 
some significant interpretive difficulties.  The following section 
addresses one of the key questions in this area:  Is Article XXI 
“self-judging,” thus insulating national security measures from 
any possibility of review from the WTO’s dispute settlement 
  
 85 W. L. Clayton, Foreword to WILCOX, supra note 42, at ix.  William Lockhart 
Clayton was head of the U.S. delegation at the historic negotiations under the auspices 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, which culminated in the 
signing of ITO Charter.  The ITO never came into existence, primarily because 
Congress refused to ratify it based on concerns from the business sector that 
developing countries had too much leeway to expropriate foreign property.  See Drache, 
supra note 45, at 28. 
 86 Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and 
Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 424, 426 (1999). 
 87 Id. 
 88 GATT, supra note 44, art. XXI. 
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mechanism?  After reviewing relevant authority on the 
question, the section then moves on to argue that even 
accepting the self-judging argument, Article XXI contains a 
two-fold requirement that must be satisfied if a measure is to 
be consistent with its terms:  proportionality and development.  
In other words, Article XXI limits members to taking only 
those measures that are “necessary”; this necessity obligation 
can only be satisfied if the measure taken is proportionate to 
the harm being addressed and does not unduly burden the 
development needs of poorer developing countries.   
The question of how Article XXI is to be interpreted is 
not merely a technical one.  In a post-September 11 world 
where the War on Terror promises to be a long one, and where 
the enemy has no home or well defined borders, it is of critical 
importance to have a clear understanding of what is 
permissible under the national security exception.  Otherwise, 
the security exception promises to unravel the careful balance 
of rights and obligations constructed by the WTO Agreement.   
1. On the Self-Judging Nature of Article XXI 
In 1947, only a few short years after the restoration of 
peace in Europe, and with the Continent in economic ruin, 
fifty-four countries ushered in a new era of trade relations with 
the signing of the Final Act of the Havana Charter for the 
International Trade Organization (“ITO”).89  The unfettered 
exercise of sovereign rights had only led to a political 
meltdown, and in this new era, notions of sovereignty were to 
be tempered with economic cooperation.   
But with the memory of World War II fresh in the 
delegates’ minds, the need to balance the economic 
development promised by greater cooperation with national 
security considerations was paramount; the clash of these 
somewhat competing interests caused negotiators not 
inconsiderable difficulties.90  As one U.S. delegate noted: 
We gave a good deal of thought to the question of the security 
exception . . . .  We recognized that there was a great danger of 
  
 89 HON. JAMES G. FULTON & HON. JACOB K. JAVITS, REPORT FOR THE S. 
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 80TH CONG., THE INT’L TRADE ORG., AN APPRAISAL OF THE 
HAVANA CHARTER IN RELATION TO UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, WITH A DEFINITIVE 
STUDY OF ITS PROVISIONS 8 (Comm. Print 1948).  Argentina and Poland were the two 
lone dissenting governments who participated in the negotiations but failed to sign on 
to the agreement.  Id. 
 90 WILCOX, supra note 42, at 36. 
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having too wide an exception . . . because that would permit 
anything under the sun. . . .  [T]here must be some latitude here for 
security measures.  It is really a question of balance.91 
The balance struck during the ITO negotiations 
ultimately led to adoption of the security exception in GATT 
Article XXI, which provides:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the 
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security 
interests; or  
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from 
which they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations;  
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in 
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.92 
The greatest cause of debate and consternation, and the 
section most invoked by far, has been section (b) (iii).  The 
question surrounding Article XXI (b) (iii) has been exactly who 
is allowed to interpret its terms?  Despite the wealth of 
competing arguments, a review of relevant authority—GATT 
practice and GATT/WTO jurisprudence—fails to yield a 
definitive answer.   
a. Reviewing Relevant Authority 
Despite the apparent open-ended language of Article 
XXI—or perhaps because of it—the national security exception 
  
 91 Quoted in ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 600 (6th 
ed. 1995) [hereinafter GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX]. 
 92 GATT, supra note 88, art. XXI (emphasis added). 
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has rarely been invoked by WTO members.93  This surprising 
restraint evidences WTO members’ recognition that with 
  
 93 No Article XXI cases have gone to dispute settlement under the WTO 
system.  The European Union did raise a claim against the United States’ Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C §§ 6021-6091 (better known as 
the Helms-Burton Act), which penalized foreign companies “trafficking” in property 
formerly owned by U.S. citizens that had been expropriated by the Cuban government 
during the revolution.  Given the sensitive nature of U.S.-Cuban relations in the WTO, 
the United States has refused all dealings with the communist government.  Should 
the matter have proceeded to dispute settlement, the United States undoubtedly would 
have invoked Article XXI.  The parties ultimately reached a negotiated solution 
without resort to the WTO’s formal dispute mechanism.  Resolution on the 
Negotiations Between the Commission and the U.S. Administration on the Helms-
Burton Act, June 10, 1997, 1997 OJ (C 304) 116. 
  Under the old GATT system, only a handful of matters concerning Article 
XXI were ever notified or addressed by the Contracting Parties: 
1. United States–Czechoslovakia (1949): Czechoslovakia sought GATT 
action on a U.S. export control licensing scheme, which prevented the export 
of certain goods to Czechoslovakia.  The Czech government brought its 
complaint under GATT Articles I and XXI, but its claim was ultimately 
rejected by the GATT panel.  GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 602. 
2. Ghana–Portugal (1961): Ghana imposed a total ban on trade with 
Portugal at the latter’s accession to the GATT claiming Portugal’s support of 
the war in Angola constituted a potential threat to the peace of the African 
continent.  Any action which might pressure the Portuguese Government into 
lessening this danger was justified in the essential security interest of 
Ghana.  GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 600. 
3. United States–Cuba (1962): The United States imposed an embargo on 
trade with Cuba a few years after the Cuban Revolution and justified the 
measure as a matter of national security.  GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra 
note 91, at 605. 
4. Sweden (global measure) (1975): Sweden imposed quota restrictions on 
certain footwear imported from any GATT contracting party claiming 
essentially that decreasing domestic production of footwear threatened its 
security by calling into question Sweden’s ability to outfit its military:  
[The] decrease in domestic production [of footwear] has become a 
critical threat to the emergency planning of Sweden’s economic 
defence . . . necessitat[ing] the maintenance of a minimum domestic 
production capacity in vital industries . . . to secure the provision of 
essential products necessary to meet basic needs in case of war or 
other emergency in international relations. 
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 603.  The GATT Contracting 
Parties, we are told, “expressed doubts as to the justification of these 
measures under the General Agreement.”  Id. 
5. European Community–Argentina (1982): The EC as well as its member 
states, along with Canada and Australia, suspended imports from Argentina 
in retaliation for Argentinean armed intervention in the Falkland/Malvinas 
Islands.  Argentina was ultimately successful in getting the GATT 
Contracting Parties to issue an interpretation of Article XXI, which provided 
in part that “the contracting parties undertake, individually and 
jointly: . . . to abstain from taking restrictive trade measures, for reasons of a 
non-economic character, not consistent with the General Agreement.”  GATT 
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 603 (alteration in original).  The 
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liberal use, Article XXI could easily evolve into “the exception 
that swallowed GATT.”94  But its limited explicit use in practice 
has not prevented controversy from swirling around Article 
XXI almost from its adoption.   
As the dominant users of Article XXI, developed 
countries take a decidedly “hands off” approach to the 
interpretation of the national security exception.95  As early as 
1949, in the first dispute involving Article XXI, the United 
States insisted that the security exception was “a virtually 
unlimited escape clause, controlled only by the general policy 
notion that the GATT system should not be undermined 
  
Contracting Parties additionally adopted notification requirements for 
measures taken pursuant to GATT Article XXI.  See Decision Concerning 
Article XXI of the General Agreement, L/5426 (Nov. 30, 1982), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(29th Supp.), at 23 (1982). 
6. United States–Nicaragua (1985):  The United States notified the GATT 
contracting parties of its imposition of a trade embargo on Nicaraguan 
exports several years after the populist Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(Frente Sandinista de Liberación or FSLN) took control of the government.  
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 603.  For further discussion of 
the dispute, see text and footnotes supra section II.B. 
7. European Communities–Yugoslavia (1992): The EC and its member 
states revoked Yugoslavia’s preferential access to the EC market—citing 
Article XXI—in an effort to force a peaceful solution to the Yugoslavian 
conflict. Yugoslavia protested, arguing that its situation was “a specific one 
[that] does not correspond to the . . . meaning of Article XXI(b) and (c).”  
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 604.  The GATT Council 
established a dispute panel to examine the EC’s action, pursuant to a request 
from Yugoslavia.  Id.  But with the dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, the Article XXI dispute was superceded by events, and the 
matter quickly devolved into a discussion of whether the newly reconstituted 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) could 
participate in GATT as the successor nation.  Id. at 604-05. 
These seven matters listed above will be referred to hereinafter as “Article XXI 
Measures in GATT Practice.” 
 94 RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO 
SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW 157 (1998).  No Article XXI disputes 
have been adjudicated under the WTO system, and only a handful of such measures 
were ever notified to the GATT.  See supra note 93.  But the controversy surrounding 
Article XXI meant that GATT members often chose not to notify their security 
measures to the GATT but rather to implicitly rely on the security exception.  See 
generally Wesley Cann, Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO 
Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a 
New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilaterism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413 (2001).  
In 1982, at the instigation of Argentina, the GATT Contracting Parties adopted 
provisions requiring notification of such measures.  Decision Concerning Article XXI of 
the General Agreement, supra note 93, at 23. 
 95 But see supra note 93 (Ghana’s invocation of Article XXI to justify a total 
ban on Portuguese goods). 
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through the use of the security exception.”96  When GATT 
members subsequently discussed the United Kingdom’s trade 
embargo on Argentina in retaliation for its armed intervention 
in the Falkland Islands, the United States again declared that 
“the General Agreement left to each contracting party the 
judgment as to what it considered to be necessary to protect its 
security interests.  The [Contracting Parties] had no power to 
question that judgment.”97  The UK echoed that view, 
maintaining that “[t]he exercise of these rights constituted a 
general exception to the GATT and ‘required neither 
notification, justification, nor approval.’”98   
By and large, developing countries reject the notion of a 
self-judged security exception.99  There have been no WTO 
disputes involving Article XXI and little in the way of GATT 
jurisprudence to resolve the matter.100  While the 
preponderance of scholarly writing has rejected the notion that 
Article XXI is self-judging, some scholars disagree.101  
Regardless of the merits of either position, a definitive view on 
the interpretation of Article XXI, at least with respect to its 
self-judging character, is beyond the scope of this article.  
Rather, this article seeks to make a more fundamental point:  
No matter who gets to interpret it, the WTO Agreement 
contains requirements on how the national security exception 
should be applied.  The question of whether Article XXI is self-
  
 96 Hahn, supra note 48, at 569.  The dispute was brought by Czechoslovakia 
against the United States for the imposition of a discriminatory export licensing 
scheme that prohibited exportation of certain key products to the then Communist 
state. 
 97 Quoted in BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 94, at 157. 
 98 Hahn, supra note 48, at 574. 
 99 But see Ghana’s invocation of Article XXI to justify its trade embargo 
against Portugal, supra note 93.  Ghana specifically argued that “under this Article 
each contracting party was the sole judge of what was necessary in its essential 
security interest.”  GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 600.  
 100 See supra note 93.  In Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against 
Nicaragua, The International Court of Justice had an opportunity to examine the U.S. 
trade embargo against Nicaragua.  In doing so, it compared the language found in 
GATT Article XXI with the language contained in article XXI of the 1956 Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua.  
Ultimately, the ICJ concluded: 
After examining the available material, particularly the Executive Order of 
President Reagan of 1 May 1985, the Court finds that the mining of 
Nicaraguan ports, and the direct attacks on ports and oil installations, and 
the general trade embargo of 1 May 1985, cannot be justified as necessary to 
protect the essential security interests of the United States. 
Military And Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 101 See generally Cann, supra note 94.  
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judging reduces the focus to only one portion—the “it” 
element—of the Article XXI analysis (“Nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any contracting 
party from taking any action which it considers 
necessary . . . .”).  Left out of the analysis is an equally 
compelling question: How should the term “necessary” be 
defined?  Addressing that question, however, requires an initial 
examination of the critical assumption underlying the self-
judging debate—the belief that without an enforcement 
mechanism, no requirements or obligations can exist.   
b. A “Right Without a Remedy?” 
Implicit in the self-judging/non-self-judging debate is 
the assumption that without recourse to a coercive dispute 
settlement mechanism, a country against whom an Article XXI 
measure has been imposed has no hope of influencing the way 
in which the country taking such action chooses to impose it.  
In short, both proponents and opponents subscribe to the 
maxim of ubi jus ibi remedium—there is no right without a 
remedy.102   
International legal scholarship is rich in theoretical and 
empirical analyses of state compliance with international 
obligations and norms in the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms. What emerges is an understanding that states 
uphold their obligations for reasons other than mere coercion.103  
Enforcement in international law is always a challenge given 
the continuing preeminence of sovereignty.  But even in the 
absence of enforcement, international law imposes on states a 
duty to carry out their treaty obligations in good faith104—
  
 102 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23. 
 103 See, e.g., Omar M. Dajani, Shadow or Shade: The Roles of International 
Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. ___ (forthcoming 2007; 
manuscript on file with author) (maintaining that “international law may exert 
influence not only as a result of the shadow it casts over bargaining, but also by virtue 
of the shade it offers—that is, its perceived value, independent of the threat of 
enforcement, as an objective and legitimate standard for resolving disputed issues”).  
See also Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early 
Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158, 163-64 (2000) (noting 
that “[n]either GATT nor the WTO possess centralized enforcement power, the upshot 
being that both have relied on the complainant itself to implement any retaliatory 
measures that may be authorized. . . .  [T]his threat [of such enforcement alone] is 
obviously insufficient to induce [concessions] in the majority of cases . . . .”). 
 104 The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda holds that “Every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”  Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available 
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indeed, states must refrain from acts that would defeat the 
object and purpose of the treaty even before it is ratified.105  
Thus, under the WTO’s “single undertaking,”106 members are 
bound by all WTO rules not because there is some coercive 
force compelling compliance but because they undertook those 
obligations in good faith. 
There is much to suggest that this good faith 
presumption is well founded.  The trillions of dollars of world 
trade that takes place every day, 98% of which is covered by 
the WTO Agreement, has led to only a handful of disputes since 
1995.107  Many of those have been resolved at the consultations 
stage between members, never giving rise to an actual 
dispute.108  Thus, most of the time most members act in 
accordance with most of their WTO obligations.  And in 
instances where at least one side has perceived that a 
member’s action was inconsistent with its obligations, the 
disputing parties were able to come to a negotiated settlement.  
These accommodations and negotiated agreements are possible 
because states find some benefit in complying with their 
  
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 105 Vienna Convention, supra note 104, art. 18. 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty when: 
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the 
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made 
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or 
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry 
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly 
delayed. 
Id. 
 106 The WTO noted: “It is now well established that the WTO Agreement is a 
‘single undertaking’ and therefore all WTO obligations are generally cumulative and 
Members must comply with all of them simultaneously unless there is a formal 
‘conflict’ between them.”  Report of the Panel, Korea − Definitive Safeguard Measure on 
Imports of Certain Dairy Products, ¶ 7.38, WT/DS98/R (June 21, 1999).  
 107 Dispute Settlement Body Overview, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement 
Cases, WT/DS/OV/26 (Mar. 1, 2006).  The WTO has been notified to date of 335 
requests for consultations; 110 of these cases have adopted the Appellate Body, Panel, 
or Panel Compliance Reports.  Id. 
 108 Of the 335 requests for consultations, fifty resulted in “Mutually Agreed 
Solutions,” twenty-nine became “Inactive” (terminated, panel request withdrawn, etc.), 
sixteen resulted in “Arbitrations on Level of Suspension of Concessions” (pursuant to 
arbitration proceedings under Articles 22.6 and 22.7 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the 
Subsidies agreement), and fifteen were given “WTO Authorizations of Suspension of 
Concessions” (pursuant to Article 22.7 of the DSU and 4.10 of the Subsidies 
Agreement).  Id. 
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obligations (or not breaching them in the first instance) that 
has little to do with a dispute settlement mechanism.   
Professor Hudec’s famous study, though now somewhat 
dated, bears out this conclusion at least in part.  Evaluating 
state compliance with GATT panel reports, Hudec found that 
at a time when few penalties attached and few enforcement 
mechanisms existed, contracting parties largely complied with 
their GATT obligations.109  That outcome is not surprising 
considering that for nearly thirty years GATT was a 
“diplomatic” system, one of the hallmarks of which was the 
critical need for cooperation among members in order for 
decisions to be taken.110  Despite the shift in 1995 from a 
diplomatic to a rules-based system, cooperation remains the 
hallmark of WTO decision-making.  For example, consensus 
rather than majority voting remains the norm in the WTO; 
thus, if even one member protests, consensus is not reached 
and action normally will not be taken.111  The need for 
consensus voting is perhaps one explanation as to why 
countries would comply with their obligations in the absence of 
an effective enforcement mechanism.   
There is of course some basis for holding the competing 
viewpoint that states will not act unless forced to do so.  
Certainly the WTO currently is in an implementation crisis:  In 
several controversial and high profile cases, members—mainly 
  
 109 HUDEC, ENFORCING TRADE LAW, supra note 47, at 6. 
 110 Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An 
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4 (1999).  Hudec claims:  
[D]uring the first thirty years of GATT history, roughly 1948-1978, the GATT 
disputes procedure did exhibit a distinctly diplomatic character.  Its 
operating procedures were quite ill-defined, its legal rulings were written in 
vague language that suggested more than it said, and both its procedures and 
its rulings left plenty of room for negotiation.  In 1970, the artful ambiguity of 
this early GATT procedure led this author to christen its methods “A 
Diplomat’s Jurisprudence.” 
Id.  He went on to note: 
After 1980, the GATT dispute settlement procedure transformed itself into an 
institution based primarily on the authority of legal obligation.  The GATT 
procedure’s transformation into a more “judicial” or “juridical” instrument 
was not only remarkable in its own right, but more important to our present 
subject, the development of these legal powers and their general acceptance 
by GATT governments laid the essential foundation for even stronger legal 
powers that followed under the WTO. 
Id. 
 111 For further discussion on the WTO’s consensus voting methods, see, for 
example, Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 
(2005). 
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the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European 
Union—have refused to implement cases they have lost.112  
Even more to the point is the U.S.–Nicaragua Article XXI 
dispute.113  In that case, the United States imposed a trade 
embargo on Nicaragua in retaliation for the communist 
government’s “policies and practices,” which allegedly 
constituted an extraordinary threat to American security.114  
After having a difficult time securing authorization to establish 
a dispute settlement panel,115 Nicaragua ultimately received 
little for its trouble.  The panel made no ruling on Nicaragua’s 
allegation that the U.S. embargo, even if justified under Article 
XXI, nullified or impaired benefits accruing to it under the 
GATT.  The panel based its determination not on the legal 
merits of Nicaragua’s position, but on its determination that no 
adequate countermeasures could be authorized to Nicaragua 
should it prevail on its claim.  In short, the panel declined to 
address the question of whether Nicaragua’s rights had been 
  
 112 See, e.g., United States − Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations – 
Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, 
WT/DS108/AB/RW2 (Feb. 13, 2006); U.S. − Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005); United States − Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/13 (Aug. 19, 2005); United States 
− Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC − Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/1 
(Nov. 10, 2004). 
 113 U.S.-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, supra note 48. 
 114 Executive Order 12513 reads: 
I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, find that the 
policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the 
United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that 
threat. 
I hereby prohibit all imports into the United States of goods and services of 
Nicaraguan origin; all exports from the United States of goods to or destined 
for Nicaragua, except those destined for the organized democratic resistance, 
and transactions relating thereto.   
Quoted in U.S.-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, supra note 48.  The Reagan 
Administration was later to run into trouble for trading arms for hostages in order to 
support the Sandinistas, the so-called “organized democratic resistance.”  See generally 
H. REP. NO. 433, S. REP. NO. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair). 
 115 The United States made the now familiar argument that its actions were 
covered under Article XXI:(b)(iii) and that “[a] panel could therefore not address the 
validity of, nor the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii).”  
U.S.-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, supra note 48, at 1.  Nicaragua was 
ultimately successful in getting a panel established, but at the insistence of the United 
States the terms of reference specifically precluded the Panel from examining or 
judging the validity of or motivation for U.S. invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii).  Id. at 1-
2.  At the time, establishment of a panel was not an automatic right. 
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violated precisely because it concluded there would be no way 
to remedy the situation:   
The Panel noted that, under the embargo . . . not only imports from 
Nicaragua into the United States were prohibited but also exports 
from the United States to Nicaragua.  In these circumstances, a 
suspension of obligations by Nicaragua towards the United States 
could not alter the balance of advantages accruing to the two 
contracting parties under the General Agreement in Nicaragua’s 
favour. 
The Panel noted that the United States had stated that an 
authorization permitting Nicaragua to suspend obligations towards 
the United States “would be of no consequence in the present case 
because the embargo had already cut off all trade relations between 
the United States and Nicaragua” and that Nicaragua had agreed 
that “a recommendation by the Panel that Nicaragua be authorized 
to withdraw its concessions in respect of the United States would 
indeed be a meaningless step because of the two-way embargo.” 
The Panel therefore had to conclude that, even if it were found that 
the embargo nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Nicaragua 
independent of whether or not it was justified under Article XXI, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES could, in the circumstances of the present 
case, take no decision ... that would re-establish the balance of 
advantages which had accrued to Nicaragua under the General 
Agreement prior to the embargo” … 
In the light of the foregoing considerations the Panel decided not to 
propose a ruling this case on the basic question of whether actions 
under Article XXI could nullify or impair GATT benefits of the 
adversely affected contracting party.116 
But if U.S.–Nicaragua illustrates anything, it is that 
dispute settlement in the area of national security simply will 
not work—particularly in a superpower versus developing 
country “showdown.”117  Despite the lack of available recourse 
to dispute settlement, however, less powerful developing 
countries have managed to obtain some benefits within the 
trading system, including, for example, adoption of the 
Generalized System of Preferences and other “special and 
differential rights.”118 
  
 116 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 117 Indeed, for developing countries dispute settlement has not been an 
effective tool.  See, e.g., Communication from Nicaragua, United States-Trade Measures 
Affecting Nicaragua, L/5847 (July 15, 1985).  See also Victor Mosoti, Africa in the First 
Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 427 (2006), available at 
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/427. 
 118 See, e.g., GATT, supra note 44, pt. IV. 
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The greatest refutation of the position of proponents of 
the “no right without a remedy” argument has been the 
evolution of Article XXI itself.  Beginning as it did with the 
general premise that the national security exception required 
“neither notification, justification, nor approval,” the position of 
developed countries has shifted significantly—or, more 
accurately, GATT/WTO practice has changed.  Where 
developed countries once argued that Article XXI required no 
notification, GATT members adopted the Understanding on 
Article XXI, which specifically requires notification.119  Where 
developed countries once argued that no justification is 
required under Article XXI, in fact the practice has been to 
provide some sort of justification.120 With respect to CSI, as 
described further below, the United States has provided a full 
explanation for taking action.121  And finally, where developed 
countries once argued that Article XXI required no approval, in 
practice they have lobbied for such approval.  In at least one 
instance, the U.S.–Czechoslovakia 1949 Article XXI dispute, 
GATT approval was explicitly forthcoming.122  But even without 
a panel determination, members imposing Article XXI 
measures seek approval at least from their allies.  In the 
European Community–Argentina matter, for example, the 
United Kingdom sought “approval” and support from its allies, 
and the Article XXI measure was imposed not only by the 
European Community but also by Canada and Australia.123 
Thus, even accepting the argument that Article XXI 
measures are self-judging and therefore ultimately are not 
subject to evaluation by any dispute settlement body, one is 
  
 119 Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, L/5426 (Dec. 2, 
1982), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1983).  “The Contracting Parties decide that: 
(1) Subject to the exception in Article XXI:a, contracting parties should be informed to 
the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under Article XXI.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 120 Article XXI Measures in GATT Practice, supra note 93.  
 121 In this instance, the United States took pains to explain the measure and 
its rationale, rather than merely imposing it.  See, e.g., Trade Policy Review, Mexico 
Question & Answer, supra note 82. 
 122 Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting: Held at Hotel Verdun, 
Annecy, at 9, GATT/CP.3/SR.22 (June 8, 1949), available at http://gatt.stanford.edu/ 
bin/object.pdf?90060100.  The summary notes: “The Chairman, however, was of the 
opinion that . . . the United States Government had defended its actions under Articles 
XX and XXI which embodied exceptions to the general rule contained in Article I.”  Id.  
A vote by roll-call resulted in one affirmative (Czechoslovakia), seventeen negatives, 
three abstentions, and two absent votes, approving the U.S.’s use of Article XXI.  Id. 
 123 GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 603. 
2007] TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 421 
still left with the question of whether such measures must 
conform to any WTO obligations at all, and if so, what?   
2. The “Development Dimension”:  Interpreting Article 
XXI’s Necessity Obligation  
A WTO member is not authorized under Article XXI to 
take any action it chooses in the name of national security.  By 
its terms, the security exception limits the available response 
to those actions that are necessary.  What are the limits of this 
necessity requirement? 
The argument to be developed below maintains that the 
“necessary” language of Article XXI cannot be read in isolation.  
The WTO Appellate Body has long relied on the interpretive 
rule of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which states that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.”124  When the necessity obligation is so 
read, it becomes clear that a measure is “necessary” if and only 
if it is proportionate to the harm faced by the invoking country 
and that the measure does not unduly burden the development 
objectives of vulnerable developing countries. 
Even if the text of Article XXI itself does not suggest a 
broader interpretive reading, general norms of equity and 
fairness, along with the nature of this new War on Terror—a 
war without an end date against an enemy without 
geographical boundaries—calls for a reinterpretation.  Article 
XXI surely could not have been intended to allow a member to 
  
 124 Vienna Convention, supra note 104, art. 31.  In United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products, the Appellate Body concluded:  
The Panel did not follow all of the steps of applying the “customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law” as required by Article 3.2 of the 
DSU.  As we have emphasized numerous times, these rules call for an 
examination of the ordinary meaning of the words of a treaty, read in their 
context, and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty involved.  A 
treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular 
provision to be interpreted.  It is in the words constituting that provision, 
read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the 
treaty must first be sought.  Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is 
equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the 
reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the 
treaty as a whole may usefully be sought. 
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle]. 
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reconfigure the world trade order in such a way as to unduly 
burden and penalize the most vulnerable members. 
a. Proportionality 
It is by now well established in WTO jurisprudence that 
as an exception to the general treaty obligations of the WTO 
Agreement, Article XXI is to be narrowly construed.125  Thus, 
the apparently expansive language that would allow a member 
to take “any measure” must be constrained by certain core or 
fundamental principles of international law, one of which is the 
principle of proportionality.  As one court notes, the principle of 
proportionality requires that “the application of . . . rules . . . 
must be appropriate for securing attainment of the objective 
which they pursue and must not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain it.”126  In short, the basic premise underlying 
the proportionality principle is that the punishment must fit 
the crime; one is justified in responding to an attack, but both 
the means employed to respond and the level of the response 
must be calibrated to the harm actually suffered.  Or, to use 
less war-and-crime laden language, the means employed to 
address a problem must be appropriate for securing the 
objective and cannot go beyond what is necessary to attain it. 
The proportionality principle is central to an analysis of 
Article XXI because it establishes limits on the type, manner 
and amount of the countermeasure a member may take to 
protect its essential security interests.  But, as with most 
interpretations of the provisions of Article XXI, the 
proportionality principle applied in this context is not without 
controversy.  One could make the argument that a 
  
 125 See, e.g., Report of the Panel, Japan − Restrictions on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products, L/6253 (Feb. 2, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp) at 163 (1989).  
The United States argued that “[a]ny exceptions to the ban on quantitative restrictions 
had to be construed as narrowly as possible, and all criteria for such an exception had 
to be met.”  Id. ¶ 3.2.2.  The panel concurred, noting: 
In order for an import restriction to be justified under Article XI:2(c)(i) all of 
the conditions noted above must be fulfilled. Therefore, in those cases in 
which the Panel found that one condition was not met, it did not consider it 
necessary to examine the restriction further in the light of the other 
conditions. 
Id. ¶ 5.3.  See also Report of the Panel, European Economic Community − Restrictions 
on Imports of Apples, L/6513 (June 22, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 135 
(1989).  
 126 The European Court of Justice also employs the principle of proportionality 
in its jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Case C-58/98, Corsten, 2000 E.C.R. I-7919, I-7957. 
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proportionality analysis is not relevant to an interpretation of 
Article XXI.  The national security exception is unlike GATT’s 
other general exception—Article XX’s health, safety and morals 
exception—which specifically recognizes a “least trade 
restrictive” limitation.127  But that argument merely re-engages 
  
 127 The chapeau to GATT Article XX specifically provides: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures. 
GATT, supra note 44, art. XX.  The Appellate Body has interpreted that language as 
follows: 
Turning then to the chapeau of Article XX, we consider that it embodies the 
recognition on the part of WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of 
rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or 
another of the exceptions of Article XX, specified in paragraphs (a) to (j), on 
the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members under the 
GATT 1994, on the other hand. Exercise by one Member of its right to invoke 
an exception, such as Article XX(g), if abused or misused, will, to that extent, 
erode or render naught the substantive treaty rights in, for example, Article 
XI:1, of other Members. Similarly, because the GATT 1994 itself makes 
available the exceptions of Article XX, in recognition of the legitimate nature 
of the policies and interests there embodied, the right to invoke one of those 
exceptions is not to be rendered illusory. The same concept may be expressed 
from a slightly different angle of vision, thus, a balance must be struck 
between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and 
the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other 
Members. To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an 
exception would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty 
obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other Members. If the 
abuse or misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive, the Member, in effect, 
reduces its treaty obligation to a merely facultative one and dissolves its 
juridical character, and, in so doing, negates altogether the treaty rights of 
other Members. The chapeau was installed at the head of the list of “General 
Exceptions” in Article XX to prevent such far-reaching consequences. 
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 124, ¶ 156. 
  Article XXI lacks the explicit tempered language to be found in Article XX, 
but the argument developed here would implicitly draw in to Article XXI, the 
jurisprudence the Appellate Body has developed with regard to Article XX.  See, e.g., 
Rene E. Browne, Note, Revisiting “National Security” in an Interdependent World: The 
GATT Article XXI Defense After Helms-Burton, 86 GEO. L.J. 405, 423-24 (1997) 
(arguing “[b]ecause Article XX also describes ‘exceptions’ that justify trade restrictive 
measures under GATT, it is the section of the agreement most analogous to Article 
XXI.  It would seem reasonable—in the absence of any decisions pertinent to the 
security exceptions and considering Article XXI’s proximity and substantive similarity 
to Article XX—for a panel reviewing Article XXI to consider Article XX decisions.”).  
Browne goes on to argue for the incorporation of Article XX’s “least trade restrictive 
measure” requirement into Article XXI: 
A similar construction applied to Article XXI would allow parties to 
determine their own security interests, just as parties determine their own 
domestic environmental or public health policies. When these policies have 
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the self-judging/non-self-judging debate:  There is no question 
that Article XX allows a panel to make the assessment of 
whether a measure is proportionate—i.e., least trade 
restrictive.  But arguing that a panel cannot make a similar 
assessment with respect to Article XXI is not to say that Article 
XXI does not, nevertheless, require a measured response to a 
national security emergency.  Admittedly, however, some 
countries have tried to make the claim for a proportionality 
standard in Article XXI, with little success.128  But in the case of 
CSI, whether the measure applied must conform to some 
standard of proportionality is a less difficult legal hurdle given 
the United States appears to acknowledge, at least tacitly, the 
need for such a standard.129  In the WTO’s 2005 review of U.S. 
trade policies, the European Union and the United States 
exchanged the following set of questions and answers: 
Question:  (EU #3) 
What procedures does the U.S. have in place to ensure that the 
principle of proportionality/least trade restrictiveness and non-
discrimination have been adequately observed in the development of 
new proposals and new measures to increase security against future 
terrorist attacks?  Have there been any risk analyses undertaken or 
studies into the likely impact on trade flows of specific measures? 
Answer: (United States) 
CBP has numerous layers of targeting and risk management tools in 
place to assist in making decisions concerning threat assessments.  
By using advance information, risk management and technology, 
and by partnering with other nations and with the private sector, 
  
extraterritorial effect that impairs other parties’ rights under GATT, 
however, the party invoking the exception would have to demonstrate that no 
alternative measures consistent with the GATT, or less inconsistent with it, 
are available to achieve these essential security objectives.   
Id. at 426.  But see Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys With International Trade Law, 31 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (concluding “[t]he first feature of article XXI is that it is 
an all-embracing exception to GATT obligations.  This point is evident from the first 
word of the article: ‘nothing.’  Once a WTO Member relies on article XXI to implement 
a measure against another Member, the sanctioning Member need not adhere to any 
GATT obligations toward the target Member.”). 
 128 In the United States – Nicaragua dispute, for example, some countries 
maintained that U.S. action was disproportionate, but the issue was not addressed by 
the GATT panel.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Minutes of Meeting Held in 
the Centre William Rappard on 29 May 1985, C/M/188 (June 28, 1985), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91150029.pdf. 
 129 Question to the United States from the European Union during TPRM: 
United States – Trade Policy Review Body – Minutes of Meeting – Addendum, at 31-32, 
WT/TPR/M/126/Add.3 (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm. 
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the twin goals of the United States of enhanced security and trade 
facilitation do not have to be mutually exclusive. Since 9-11, we have 
developed ways to make our borders more secure that also ensure 
the efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel.130 
In the case of a War on Terror, the need for security 
measures to be informed by a proportionality analysis becomes 
even more important.  The current war is being fought without 
a timetable for completion, and while the objective is to protect 
U.S. interests from stateless enemies, the means employed to 
achieve that objective very directly impact state actors.  In 
short, CSI adversely impacts some WTO member countries—
and will continue to do so for some time—despite the fact that 
those members are not the cause of the harm.  While 
recognizing that “collateral damage” in wartime is inevitable, 
the damage inflicted must meet some minimum standards of 
decency and fair play.  Adopting a proportionality analysis in 
Article XXI measures would achieve that equitable objective. 
Merely adopting a proportionality element would not, 
however, be sufficient.  While constraining the actions of 
stateless terrorists is the objective or the ends sought, the 
means the United States has used to achieve that objective—
the Container Security Initiative—has great repercussions for 
developing countries, most of whom are no more than innocent 
bystanders in the War on Terror.  Thus, to address that 
imbalance requires not just an application of the 
proportionality principle—balancing means and ends—but it 
also requires a deliberate, self-conscious recognition of the need 
to protect the interests of developing countries. 
b. Development 
Some have maintained that “there is no distinction in 
international law between developed and developing countries 
in matters of security.”131  The basic assumption underlying 
that statement is that when national security considerations 
are implicated, a country is authorized to take any action 
necessary for its own protection regardless of the adverse 
impact such action could have on developing countries; in 
  
 130 Id. 
 131 Statement of the United States Delegate Before the GATT Council, 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre 
William Rappard on 29 June 1982, at 19, C/M/159 (Aug. 10, 1982), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90440048.pdf [hereinafter Statement of 
U.S. Delegate Before the GATT Council]. 
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short, national security concerns trump all other considerations 
and allow a member to take a measure at any cost.  But taking 
a measure at any cost is exactly what Article XXI and the WTO 
Agreement are meant to prevent.  Indeed, it is the foundational 
principle of the trading system that “if each of us insists on 
retaining freedom to take action without first considering how 
it would affect our neighbors, we shall provoke bad feeling, 
retaliation, and economic war.”132 
While it is true that Article XXI makes no mention of 
developed or developing countries, a proper interpretation of 
the national security exception prohibits one from reading that 
provision in isolation; the text must be read in context in light 
of the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement.133  When read 
accordingly, it becomes clear that there is a recognized 
distinction in international trade law between developed and 
developing countries, and that developed countries have a 
special duty of care when implementing measures that may 
harm developing countries.   
That “context” of Article XXI necessarily includes other 
provisions of the WTO Agreement.  The most relevant 
provision on the duty of care developed countries owe to more 
economically vulnerable members is GATT Article XXXVII:3(c), 
which requires developed countries to: 
Have special regard to the trade interests of less-developed parties 
when considering the application of other measures permitted under 
this Agreement to meet particular problems and explore all 
possibilities of constructive remedies before applying such measures 
when they would affect essential interests of those contracting 
members.134 
And certainly the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement 
would not support the proposition that there are no differences 
between developed and developing countries in matters of 
security.135 
  
 132 WILCOX, supra note 42, at 218. 
 133 Vienna Convention, supra note 104, art. 31.  In United States − Trade 
Measures Affecting Nicaragua, supra note 93, the panel concluded that “article xxi 
could not be read in isolation and is part of legal text with which it must be reconciled.”  
See also Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 124.  
 134 GATT, supra note 44, art. XXXVII:3(c) (emphasis added). 
 135 The WTO Agreement contains a number of provisions on “special and 
differential rights” treating developing countries different from—and better than—
developed countries.  In particular, Part IV of the GATT “recall[s] that the basic 
objectives of this Agreement include the raising of standards of living and the 
progressive development of the economies of all contracting parties, and considering 
that the attainment of these objectives is particularly urgent for less-developed 
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Thus, inherent in the right of members to take action to 
protect their security interests is the concomitant obligation of 
developed countries not to act in ways that would unduly harm 
the development objectives of developing countries.  The idea 
that Article XXI measures must not be used in ways to harm 
poorer countries’ development objectives is not novel, and it has 
long been advocated by developing countries themselves.136  
What is novel is that the War on Terror presents us with an 
explicit illustration of why the adoption of a development 
standard in Article XXI is necessary.  In all previous Article 
XXI measures except Swedish Footwear, the member invoking 
the action did not adopt a global measure;137 the trade 
prohibition was always targeted at one specific country.  And in 
all instances except Swedish Footwear, the member invoking 
Article XXI took action because of some transgression the 
country on the receiving end was alleged to have committed 
that threatened the national security of the imposing state.  In 
short, past national security actions were almost always 
retaliatory measures limited to one country.  But developing 
countries that are being burdened by CSI are not the source of 
the harm CSI is meant to address.  Rather than protecting 
their interests, CSI imposes additional burdens on developing 
countries. 
One such burden is the 24-Hour Rule, which applies to 
all U.S. trading partners.  The 24-Hour Rule enables Customs 
officials to gather and process information in order to target 
high risk shipments.138  The need for information gathered 
under the 24-Hour Rule came about only after Customs had 
conceived and begun to implement CSI.139  Once it established 
  
contracting parties.”  Id. art. XXXVI:1(a).  It goes on to authorize—indeed implore—
developed countries to derogate from the rules to the benefit of developing countries: 
The developed contracting parties shall to the fullest extent possible—that  
is, except when compelling reasons, which may include legal reasons, make it 
impossible—give effect to the following provisions: 
(b) refrain from introducing, or increasing the incidence of, customs duties or 
non-tariff import barriers on products currently or potentially of particular 
export interest to less-developed contracting parties. 
Id. art. XXXVII(b). 
 136 See, e.g., Cann, supra note 101.   
 137 Article XXI Measures in GATT Practice, supra note 93. 
 138 19 C.F.R. § 4.7(b)(2) (2002) [hereinafter 24-Hour Rule]. 
 139 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-557, CONTAINER SECURITY: A 
FLEXIBLE STAFFING MODEL AND MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS WOULD 
IMPROVE OVERSEAS TARGETING AND INSPECTION EFFORTS (Apr. 2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05557.pdf. 
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the first CSI-port in Rotterdam, Customs realized that legal 
and logistical problems prevented it from having access to data 
it needed to effectively pre-screen containers.140  Rather than 
implementing a rule that would require only CSI members to 
provide the required data, Customs adopted the 24-Hour Rule, 
which would apply to CSI and non-CSI members alike.141  
The Rule requires all exporters to file an electronic 
cargo manifest declaration form twenty-four hours prior to 
loading a container either bound for the United States or 
transiting through its borders.142  Implementation of the 24-
Hour Rule is a significant obstacle for developing countries.  
Despite massive resistance from the trading community, 
Customs declared victory, claiming that there have been “no 
serious problems” in implementing the 24-Hour Rule’s 
requirements.143  But that determination rests on the claim that 
no legitimate exports were turned away or delayed as a result 
of the Rule.144  Even if true, the real impact of the 24-Hour Rule 
goes far beyond whether countries were ultimately successful 
in getting their goods past Customs.  Measuring the real 
impact of the 24-Hour Rule must include an examination of the 
rule’s implementation costs as well as the disproportionate 
impact on the goods of developing countries.145  When those 
  
 140 See GAO REPORT 2003, supra note 27, at 18. 
 141 Id. at 7. 
 142 CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9. 
 143 In a 2003 speech, Commissioner Bonner derided doomsday predictions and 
declared victory in implementing CSI and the 24-Hour Rule: 
We heard nightmarish tales about how the 24-hour rule would paralyze 
maritime trade and put companies out of business.  We heard that companies 
would not be ably to comply.  So what have we found since February 2, when 
we started enforcing compliance with the rule?  We’ve found that none of 
these doomsday predictions have come to pass. . . .  Let me make this clear to 
you: through the 24-hour rule and the Container Security Initiative (CSI)—
we are identifying shipments that pose potential threats.  These programs 
are working. 
Bonner 2003, supra note 11.  But in the same speech, Bonner himself acknowledges 
some implementation problems: “Compliance with the new  rule is high, and the 
number of disruptions is low.”  Id. 
 144 See Statement of Ambassador Linnet Deily, Deputy U.S. Trade 
Representative, Trade Policy Review Of The United States, Response to Issues Raised in 
the Course of the Review Meeting (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.usmission.ch/ 
press2004/0116Deily%20TPR.html [hereinafter Statement of Ambassador Deily] 
(asserting that “[t]he test of time has proven that there have been no instances where a 
legitimate shipment has been detained and prevented from sailing on board the vessel 
upon which it was originally scheduled to depart the foreign port.”). 
 145 In evaluating the impact of measures like the 24-Hour Rule on developing 
countries, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development concluded: 
“[p]otentially, the legitimate trade of developing countries may be adversely affected, 
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issues are factored in, it becomes clear that the 24-Hour Rule 
has had profound effects on the trading system, and those 
effects are particularly pronounced with respect to developing 
countries.  In implementing the 24-Hour Rule, the financial 
costs have been significant for all U.S. trading partners.  Even 
major trading partners with sophisticated customs regimes 
have seen their administrative costs increase by upwards of six 
hundred million dollars.146  The expenditures are significant 
enough that even exporters from rich countries are calling for 
U.S. subsidies to offset the costs of implementation,147 and the 
World Bank has underscored the need for importing and 
exporting countries to develop a cost sharing formula optimal 
for all.148   
For developing countries, the implementation cost of the 
24-Hour Rule is considerably higher.  Firstly, they bear 
additional costs not borne by developed countries.  In India, for 
example, where nearly 35% of outbound trade is headed to the 
United States, exporters are incurring a new cost of having to 
pay local agencies to assist with document processing.149  
Secondly, developing countries are starting from a lower 
technological base.  Most shippers and freight forwarders in 
developing countries conduct a manual trade and have access 
solely to telephones, typewriters and fax machines in order to 
conduct their business.150  Shifting from a manual to an 
automated system will require equipment, know-how, and 
reliable electricity supply, to name a few things, that many 
developing countries do not have.151  To be sure, in the long 
term a shift to electronic transmission will undoubtedly prove 
beneficial for developing countries through increases in 
  
due to the inability of particularly small and medium size enterprises within these 
countries, to effectively comply with the new requirements.”  UNCTAD Report, supra 
note 68, at 20.   
 146 For example, Japan’s administrative costs have increased by about $625 
million dollars.  This figure captures only the administrative costs of inputting 
shipping information into the U.S. computer system (AMS).  Id. at 25.   
 147 Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 188.  “The Hong Kong 
Shippers Council . . . and the ASEAN Federation of Forwarders Associations [exporters 
from relatively wealthy countries] have urged [the United States] to subsidize the cost 
of its new requirements and U.S. importers to share . . . the burden of providing 
information.”  Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 184-85 (“Almost 35% of outbound trade from India is headed to the 
U.S.”). 
 150 Id. at 185; UNCTAD Report, supra note 68, at 25. 
 151 Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 186; UNCTAD Report, supra 
note 68, at 25. 
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efficiency and a decrease in costs,152 but in the short to medium 
term, developing countries will have to bear the massive initial 
startup costs.  The risk is that developing country exporters 
will find it increasingly difficult to participate competitively in 
the world market.   
In addition to forcing developing countries to bear 
higher economic costs, the 24-Hour Rule affects 
disproportionately the type of cargo developing countries are 
likely to ship.  Developing countries tend to export perishable 
commodities.  Those goods are often harvested and prepared 
for shipping at the last minute. Before the 24-Hour Rule, 
documentation requirements were not an impediment to last-
minute shipments as Customs would generally allow shippers 
to provide preliminary data that would then be finalized up to 
thirty days after the shipment had arrived in the United 
States.153  This now-lost flexibility allowed shippers and freight 
forwarders to adequately verify and finalize required 
paperwork without delaying the shipment itself.154  But the 24-
Hour Rule requirement has cut the processing timeline in 
developing countries to shorter and shorter lengths.  Given 
that processing export documents is often a time consuming 
and inefficient effort in developing countries, shippers are now 
requiring that shipments be processed and ready for boarding 
much earlier than they used to; otherwise they risk delays and 
fines.155  Ports that previously accepted cargo as few as six 
hours before departure now require at least twenty-four.156  The 
  
 152 Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 186. 
 153 OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 47.   
 154 Id.  Of course, much of this hardship could be alleviated if shippers were to 
use air transportation rather than sea—presumably air transportation post-September 
11 is more secure.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-616T, 
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH INITIATIVES AND LONG-TERM 
CHALLENGES (April 1, 2003) (Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical 
Infrastructure Issues), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03616t.pdf (noting 
the security loopholes in air transportation prior to September 11, 2001, and 
highlighting changes after that period).  But the air transportation sector is one of the 
most non-liberalized in international trade.  While more than 20% of African exports 
enter the United States by air, the costs of air transportation in developing countries 
far exceeds the same costs in the developed world.  Liberalization of the air 
transportation sector likely would decrease costs of transportation, which would make 
developing country goods more competitive in developed country markets.  Global 
Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 188. 
 155 Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 184. 
 156 UNCTAD Report, supra note 68, at 23-24.   
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economic losses for developing country exports are still being 
tallied.157  
The trade-distorting impact of CSI is most pronounced 
with respect to developing countries.  In order to remain 
competitive in the current business climate, exporters in non-
CSI-certified countries may be forced to ship their goods to 
countries that have CSI ports for the onward voyage to the 
United States.158  This will undoubtedly increase non-CSI 
members’ transportation costs.  Transportation costs are a 
crucial determinant of a country’s ability to participate in the 
global economy,159  and for developing countries even a small 
increase in the price of moving goods between destinations and 
across international borders serves as a formidable trade 
barrier.160  Transit costs in developing country markets already 
are routinely two to four times higher than in rich countries.161 
Adding on the additional costs of transporting goods to CSI-
certified ports for transit to the United States further increases 
the price of those goods. Of even greater concern is the 
possibility that, in the long run, importers and exporters may 
adapt their trading patterns to avoid these additional costs by 
sourcing products from countries with CSI-certified ports. 
Thus, CSI violates U.S. obligations under GATT Article 
I.  Moreover, CSI cannot be justified under GATT Article XXI 
because it lacks a development dimension.  The following 
section goes beyond the legal debate to explore some of the 
practical reasons why CSI and future U.S. security measures 
should incorporate a development dimension.  
  
 157 See UNCTAD Report, supra note 68, at 24 (noting that “[n]o clear 
estimates of the overall costs of the 24-Hour Rule have, so far been published”).  The 
Report went on to cite an OECD study, conducted only a few months after 
implementation of the Rule began, which estimated costs at $5 to $10 billion per year.  
Over the long term, the OECD Report acknowledged a more realistic estimate would be 
in the region of $281.7 million.  Id.  The OECD report did not take into account the 
special circumstance of developing countries.  OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 47. 
 158 Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 181. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id.  While the focus within the WTO (and the GATT before that) has 
historically been on lowering tariffs, research has shown that for most developing 
countries the costs of transporting exports to foreign markets are a much greater 
hindrance to trade than are tariffs.  See id. (noting that “a comparison of countries’ 
‘transport cost incidence’ . . . shows that for 168 out of 216 U.S. trading partners, 
transport cost barriers outweigh tariff barriers”). 
 161 Id. at 179. 
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III. ENVISIONING A NEW POST-SEPTEMBER 11 SECURITY 
ARCHITECTURE 
A. Beyond the Legal Debate:  Why Future Security 
Measures Should Incorporate a Development Dimension 
The global war on terrorism is like watching water running 
downhill.  Water always goes to the place of least resistance. 
—Admiral Walter F. Doran, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander162 
Globalization has created a world in which social and 
economic ties are so intertwined that no country acting alone 
can ensure either its own prosperity or its own security.  
Particularly in the maritime transportation sector—where  a 
ship may be owned by a company in one country, crewed by the 
nationals of a second country, and carry the cargo of a third to 
a port of a fourth163—multilateral cooperation is necessary to 
effectively address the threat of terrorism.  But multilateralism 
calls for more than cooperation amongst a group of like-minded 
and similarly-situated countries.  As Mikhail Gorbachev 
recently noted, “you cannot ensure your security without 
ensuring global security.”164  Incorporating a development 
dimension into CSI is necessary not merely because a proper 
reading of the WTO Agreement would seem to call for such a 
dimension, but also because failing to do so jeopardizes our own 
security.  This section goes beyond the legal arguments 
developed above to explore some of the practical reasons why a 
development dimension in CSI, as well as in future security 
measures, is crucial. 
Terrorism recognizes no state boundaries.  Indeed, the 
new face of terrorism is one in which non-state actors play a 
leading role.165  While organizations like Al-Qaeda may have 
found sanctuary in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan or pre-
September 11 Pakistan, the hallmarks of these entities are 
  
 162 Press Release, The Int’l Institute for Strategic Studies, U.S. Maritime 
Intelligence Sharing (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.iiss.org/index.asp?pgid 
=5108. 
 163 Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 187. 
 164 Mikhail Gorbachev, Address at Univ. of the Pac. McGeorge Sch. of Law 
(Oct. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Gorbachev Statement]. 
 165 See, e.g., Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and 
International Terrorism, 27 INT’L SECURITY 30, 30 (2003) (noting that “[t]he current 
wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented 
threats from nonstate actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by 
it”). 
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their ability to work across national lines and their lack of 
formal ties or strict allegiance to any state.  After the bombings 
of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1999, 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright acknowledged the rise of 
this new breed of terrorism:  “What is new is the emergence of 
terrorist coalitions that do not answer fully to any government, 
that operate across national borders and have access to 
advanced technology.”166  The problem is that U.S. response to 
the new terrorism has been “reactive and anachronistic.”167  
Adopting measures better suited to state-centric threats, the 
United States attempts to “cast twenty-first-century terrorism 
into familiar strategic terms.”168 
CSI and programs like it are premised on the notion 
that exports from certain states pose greater security risk than 
exports from others.  CSI rewards participant states—mainly 
developed countries—for their “foresight,”169 and Customs 
focuses its resources on the presumptively more high-risk 
containers arriving from non-participating—mostly 
developing—countries.  Because the new breed of terrorists are 
not themselves bounded by state lines, at least two additional 
risks arise from U.S. action.  One possibility is that terrorists 
manage to infiltrate containers from CSI countries.  
Successfully infiltrating a CSI-container virtually assures 
success of the overall mission (detonating a nuclear device on 
U.S. shores, for example) given the presumption that those 
containers are “clean” and likely would not face further 
inspection in the United States.  Breaching security structures 
and “hijacking” a CSI container is not a far-fetched scenario; 
while CSI creates new security protocols, the system is largely 
self-regulated, leading one expert to dub it a “trust but don’t 
verify” program.170  There have already been a number of 
  
 166 Madeline Albright, quoted in Gideon Rose, It Could Happen Here: Facing 
the New Terrorism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (March/April 1999).  The bombings killed over 
200 people, most of whom were nationals of Kenya or Tanzania.  See Black Americans 
Among Victims of Kenya and Tanzania Bombings: National Report, JET, Aug. 24, 1999, 
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1355/is_n13_v94/ai_21052788 
[hereinafter Victims of Kenya and Tanzania]. 
 167 Cronin, supra note 165, at 30. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9. 
 170 Disturbing Lack of Attention Paid to America’s Security Vulnerabilities, 
Interview by Michael Moran, Executive Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, with 
Stephen E. Flynn, former Coast Guard Commander (Dec. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9471 (stating that “if you rely essentially on a trust-but-
don’t-verify system [where] you ask companies to be [responsible] but can’t determine if 
they really are, I worry that everything we defined as low risk will be redefined as high 
 
434 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
security breaches.  One of the most significant was Customs’ 
failure to inspect a number of containers that arrived in the 
United States from a CSI port after those containers were 
determined to be high-risk, but the host-government refused 
permission to inspect them in-country.171  Moreover, employing 
the most state-of-the-art inspection technology on land does not 
insulate CSI countries from terrorists intersecting their 
containers at sea.172  Some terrorist organizations have an 
intimate knowledge of the maritime transportation industry, 
not simply as interlopers but as fleet owners—Sri Lanka’s 
Tamil Tigers own a substantial fleet, as does Al-Qaeda.173  
Using their knowledge to access containers in transit is 
particularly feasible because so-called tamper-resistant 
technology—that would alert Customs to any interference with 
the container in transit—is at a nascent stage of 
development.174  Alternatively, containers from non-CSI 
countries may become more attractive to terrorists seeking 
entry into the trade supply chain.  Even if CSI allows Customs 
to deploy more of its resources to containers from non-CSI 
countries, there are insufficient resources available to inspect 
all such containers.  The possibility of terrorists using such 
containers to stage an attack against the United States is 
certainly foreseeable.  Whether in Kenya, Tanzania or Yemen, 
terrorists have long exploited the more lax security systems of 
  
risk” (alterations in original)).  In 2003, pirates staged what was believed to be a 
training run for a terrorist attack by boarding a container ship in the Malacca Strait 
and piloting it for several hours.  The pirates subsequently disappeared into the night 
without stealing anything.  Dillon, supra note 5.  They could have easily infiltrated the 
container cargo being transported. 
 171 See GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26. 
 172 The Tamil Tigers, a guerilla force at war with the Sri Lankan government 
since the 1980s, intercepted in-transit shipments of guns bound for the government 
and converted them for their own use.  OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-15. 
 173 The Tamil Tigers are perhaps the most engaged in the shipping industry, 
with a profitable fleet estimated at ten to twelve freighters.  Id. at 14.  The fleets are 
used to generate income from legitimate shipping activities.  Id.  Al Qaeda’s fleet is 
said to number fifteen cargo vessels.  Mintz, supra note 15, at A1.  Fearing Al Qaeda 
would use its fleet to escape capture, the United States reportedly assembled a 
coalition of ninety warships, including ships from the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, Australia, Italy, Japan and Bahrain, to patrol the waters around the Arabian 
Peninsula and off the coasts of Pakistan and east Africa.  Felsted & Odell, supra note 
3; Mintz, supra note 15; OECD REPORT, supra note 15, at 15. 
 174 Container inspection technology is advancing, and it may ultimately be the 
only real solution to the risks terrorists pose in this sector.  The port of L.A./Long 
Beach—the busiest port in the country—is moving toward 100% inspection of all cargo 
in the near future.  See supra note 17. 
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developing countries to launch attacks against U.S. targets.175  
Ignoring the central role developing countries play in the War 
on Terror leaves them vulnerable to proxy attacks where they 
suffer the harm but the United States is the ultimate target.176  
In so doing, the United States effectively undermines its own 
security.   
A more reasonable approach to the new terrorism is to 
assist developing countries in raising their security standards.  
Ultimately, the new security protocols and advanced 
technologies CSI fosters are beneficial to the trading system.  If 
developing countries do not begin to adopt these “best 
practices,” they will be left even further behind.  Recognizing 
that possibility, developing countries indeed have—on their 
own initiative—taken on the challenge of upgrading their 
security infrastructures.177  What remains is for the United 
States and other developed countries to recognize that 
assisting them, rather than excluding them, is the only 
practical response to the new terrorism.178  To do otherwise 
would allow gaping holes in the global security infrastructure 
that would only be exploited by terrorists.   
Thus, CSI’s present framework of engaging first with 
developed countries, and only later incorporating developing 
countries into its security web, poses significant dangers to 
U.S. security.  By alienating developing countries, the United 
States also risks undermining a multilateral trading system 
that has served American interests well.  The timing is 
particularly inauspicious considering the trading community is 
  
 175 See Rose, supra note 166, at 131; Victims of Kenya and Tanzania, supra 
note 166.  Even on U.S. soil, terrorists have used such a strategy to great effect, 
boarding commuter planes in states like Maine ultimately to board flights in New York 
bound for Los Angeles, both major airports that have far more elaborate security 
measures.  See generally NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf. 
 176 In the U.S. embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, alone, over 200 people 
were killed—most of whom were nationals.  See Victims of Kenya and Tanzania, supra 
note 166; see also supra note 59. 
 177 Jamaica, for example, adopted many of the CSI protocols well before they 
were eligible to join CSI.  See supra note 83 and accompanying text.  Similarly, the 
Agency for Air Transport Security in Africa has invested $27 million “to modernize 
member states’ airport security infrastructure.”  Global Economic Prospects, supra note 
56, at 185. 
 178 Moreover, assisting developing countries makes good political sense given 
the United States’ interest in engaging them in such U.S.-sponsored initiatives like 
United Nations Resolution 1540, which is designed to attack the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.  Resolution 1540, supra note 1, at 1-4. 
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currently in the midst of a new round of trade negotiations, the 
Doha Development Round,179 which is meant to “redress the 
existing imbalances in multilateral trade relations.”180 In 
return, developed countries are expecting developing countries 
to take on even more commitments to liberalize trade and 
implement WTO disciplines in areas like intellectual 
property.181  But the reality for developing countries is that the 
market access and other benefits they may achieve in the 
round will prove meaningless if the new security architecture 
excludes them from participation.  In short, U.S. security 
measures potentially pose the greatest non-tariff barrier to 
trade for developing countries.  The gains from the round will 
not be enough of an offset, calling into question the (already 
suspect) commitment of developed countries to redress 
imbalances inherent in the current trade order.  Developing 
countries may ultimately conclude it is not in their interest to 
take on additional commitments or, in a less overtly 
confrontational response, they may adopt a “go-slow” approach 
to their current and future implementation obligations.182  
  
 179 The Doha Round was launched in October 2001, only one month after the 
terrible September 11 attacks.  In July 2006, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy 
called a halt to negotiations after delegates failed to make progress.  See WORLD TRADE 
ORG., REPORT OF DIRECTOR-GENERAL PASCAL LAMY, AS CHAIR OF THE TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL (July 27, 2006), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_chair_report_27july06_e.htm; see also 
Madeleine Morris, What Now for Doha?, BBC NEWS, Aug. 1, 2006.  
 180 Pascal Lamy, Negotiations on the Doha Round Development Agenda: We 
Approach the Moment of Truth, Speech to the Comm. on Int’l Trade European Parl., 
Brussels (Mar. 23, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/ 
sppl21_e.htm. 
 181 Under the WTO’s single-undertaking, all WTO members must sign on to 
all WTO rules.  Currently under negotiation in the Doha Round are agriculture, cotton, 
non-agriculture market negotiations, services, trade facilitation, DSU, environmental, 
TRIPS, and rules.  World Trade Organization, Doha Work Programme, Ministerial 
Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.pdf.  For a 
discussion of the single-undertaking approach, see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 94, 
at 14.  For an evaluation of the Doha Round’s mandate and the possible impacts on 
developing countries, see SANDRA POLASKI, WINNERS AND LOSERS: IMPACT OF THE 
DOHA ROUND ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21-56 (2006). 
 182 Some might argue developing countries have already adopted a “go-slow” 
approach, considering that almost eleven years after the birth of the World Trade 
Organization, many developing countries have failed to adequately implement their 
obligations.  For developing countries, the “implementation issue” is a controversial 
one, with some experts maintaining it is not in the interest of some of the world’s 
poorest countries to implement their WTO obligations.  See, e.g., J. Michael Finger & 
Phillip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development 
Challenge, 23 WORLD ECON. 431, 511 (2000) (noting that “[i]mplementation will require 
purchasing of equipment, training of people, establishment of systems of checks and 
balances, etc.  This will cost money and the amounts of money involved are 
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Thus, the U.S. security framework jeopardizes relations with 
developing countries, and it may call into question the new 
commitments they are expected to adopt under the Doha 
negotiating round.  Security measures like CSI not only impede 
U.S. efforts to expand the rules-based trade regime into other 
sectors, but have the added effect of diluting or negating U.S. 
development initiatives.   
In recent years, U.S. development policy has 
experienced a renaissance of sorts.  In 2000, President Clinton 
signed into law the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(“AGOA”), which provides duty-free and quota-free access to 
exports from sub-Saharan Africa.183 AGOA was the first 
significant innovation in U.S.-African trade relations in 
decades. In addition, the United States has tripled its 
development assistance to Africa and has embarked on 
negotiations with the Southern African Customs Union, which, 
if successful, would result in sub-Saharan Africa’s first free 
trade area with the United States.184  Beyond the African 
continent, U.S. innovations include the Millennium Challenge 
Account, and a promised doubling of development assistance by 
2010.185  But development assistance and market access are 
insufficient inducements to counteract the competitive 
advantage of countries with CSI ports.  Business will not be 
  
substantial. . . .  An entire year’s development budget is at stake in many of the least 
developed countries.  Would such money be well spent? . . .  [F]or most of the 
developing and transition economies—some 100 countries—money spent to implement 
the WTO rules . . . would be money unproductively invested.”). 
 183 19 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000).  The African Growth and Opportunity Act was 
signed into law in 2000 as Title 1 of the Trade and Development Act of 2000, and was 
amended in 2002 by the Trade Act of 2002 (“AGOA II”).  Trade Act of 2002, ch. 5, § 353, 
Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).  In 2004, the AGOA Acceleration Act further 
modified the original act (“AGOA III”).  AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-274, 118 Stat. 820 (2004). 
 184 The Southern African Customs Union (“SACU”) came into existence in 
1969; one of the oldest customs unions in the world, SACU’s members include two 
regional economic powers—South Africa and Botswana.  Republic of S. Africa, Dep’t of 
Foreign Affairs, Southern African Customs Union (SACU): History and Present Status, 
available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sacu.htm.  Negotiations 
between the United States and SACU currently are at a deadlock.  DANIELLE 
LANGTON, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. RS21387, UNITED STATES-SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
CUSTOMS UNION (SACU) FREE TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS: BACKGROUND AND 
POTENTIAL ISSUES 4 (2005). 
 185 The Millennium Challenge Corporation, Millennium Challenge Account, 
http://www.mca.gov/about_us/overview/index.shtml; Steve Radelet & Bilal Siddiqi, Ctr. 
for Global Dev., US Pledges of Aid to Africa: Let’s Do the Numbers (2005), 
http://www.cgdev.org/files/2870_file_Accounting_for_Aid25.pdf (quoting President Bush 
as saying, “[T]he United States has tripled overseas development aid to Africa during 
my presidency and we’re making a strong commitment for the future: between 2004 
and 2010, I propose to double aid to Africa once again.”). 
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lured to Africa or other locations in the developing world as 
long as U.S. security measures continue to pose an expensive 
and unpredictable non-tariff barrier to trade.186  Without 
addressing that barrier, U.S. development initiatives are 
destined to fail—wasting both economic and political resources. 
Five years after the tragedy of September 11, the 
unilateralism that characterized U.S. action in the immediate 
aftermath appears to be abating.187  More developing countries 
are being added to the CSI program, and Customs has worked 
within the International Maritime Organization to 
internationalize the security protocols developed under CSI.188  
The United States has also played a significant role in security 
measures like the Proliferation Security Initiative and 
Resolution 1540—two significant multilateral efforts to address 
terrorism.189  While not too late, U.S. action is too little in scope, 
relegating multilateralism and the interests of developing 
countries to a mere afterthought.  The next section explores 
possible approaches to terrorism that balance security needs 
with development objectives. 
B. Crafting a Response to Terrorism that Balances Security 
with Development 
A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the 
human race lives on less than $2 a day is neither just nor stable. 
Including all of the world’s poor in an expanding circle of 
development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of 
the top priorities of U.S. international policy. 
—President George W. Bush190 
  
 186 For the economic impact of CSI, see discussion supra section II.B.2.   
 187 U.S. foreign policy in general appears to have taken an about face from the 
go-it-alone strategy prevalent in the immediate aftermath of September 11.  See, e.g., 
Sanger, supra note 41 (noting that in a recent State of the Union address, President 
Bush, who once viewed globalization as “mushy Clintonianism,” cautioned that “the 
road of isolationism and protectionism may seem broad and inviting—yet it ends in 
danger and decline”). 
 188 Recent developing countries admitted to CSI include Jamaica and The 
Bahamas.  See Ports in CSI, supra note 31.  In July 2004, the IMO’s International Ship 
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)—a comprehensive set of measures to 
enhance the security of ships and port facilities—entered into force.  The mandatory 
security measures are included as amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention.  See International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2007). 
 189 Valencia, supra note 1; Resolution 1540, supra note 1.  
 190 REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 21 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ 
nss.html [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY]. 
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Poverty and the maldistribution of wealth among 
nations create instability.191  Globalization has only exacerbated 
the divide between the wealthy and the poor; it also enables 
those who adopt violence against civilians as a tool for social 
change to export their discontent around the world.  Thomas 
Barnett, author of The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in 
the Twenty-First Century, posits that modern instabilities in 
the world order stem almost exclusively from those countries 
left out of the “functioning core” of globalization.192  The U.S. 
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 reinforce 
the lesson: countries relegated to globalization’s periphery 
merely serve as a fertile hunting ground for terrorists.193  
Logically then, integrating those countries left behind is not 
just a moral imperative but is the last best hope for ensuring 
U.S. and global security.194  The proposals that follow are thus 
broader than CSI or any single security measure; rather, they 
seek to inform the underlying basis from which the United 
States implements future antiterrorism initiatives.195   
  
 191 The point is made most clear when one examines countries where wealth is 
stagnated in the hands of a tiny minority.  Amy Chua’s World on Fire highlights the 
dangers of technical assistance projects that export U.S.-style free markets and 
democracy to developing countries without the legal and regulatory mechanism to 
protect against a “market-dominant minority” hijacking the bulk of economic activity.  
See generally AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY 
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003).  
 192 “America can only increase its security when it extends connectivity or 
expands globalization’s reach, and by doing so, progressively reduces those trouble 
spots or off-grid locations where security problems and instability tend to concentrate.”  
THOMAS P.M. BARNETT, THE PENTAGON’S NEW MAP: WAR AND PEACE IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 56 (2004). 
 193 See Victims of Kenya and Tanzania, supra note 166. 
 194 President Bush’s statement in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, 
thus somewhat misses the point.  See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 190.  
While helping the poor has been a moral imperative at least since the biblical period, in 
a post-September 11 security environment “doing good” is inevitably linked to peace 
and security.  
 195 Any prescriptions raised by those outside the government’s national 
security agencies risk being labeled “facile.”  The fears and uncertainties engendered 
by terrorist threats inevitably raise strong feelings of faith in government—citizens 
often believe, indeed need to believe, that government officials will do what is best to 
protect the nation’s security.  What we are quickly learning—and perhaps history has 
already shown—is that even in the face of terrorism our national response runs the 
risk of being captured by special interests and pork barrel politics.   
  A disturbing report on U.S. spending on port defense has found that 
funding that should be utilized to shore up the nation’s most vulnerable ports—its 
frontline in the War on Terror—instead has become a casualty of pork barrel politics.  
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF PORT 
SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/ 
mgmtrpts/OIG_05-10_Jan05.pdf. The study found that Wyoming has received four 
times as much antiterrorism money per capita as New York.  Grants were also given 
 
440 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
Some argue that national security considerations trump 
all others, including civil liberties and certainly international 
obligations.196  Particularly where commercial interests are 
concerned, the average citizen likely would rather see the 
government err on the side of caution, even if the measures 
taken unduly impact commerce or development.197  But the U.S. 
government—and more specifically, Customs—does not 
subscribe to that view.  CSI aims to balance security interests 
with trade and development considerations198—one objective of 
the program is “enhancing homeland and border security while 
facilitating growth and economic development within the 
international trade community.”199  Thus, the “closed borders” 
approach to terrorism some would advocate simply is not an 
option.  It remains an open question, however, as to how to 
strike the proper balance between security, commerce and 
economic development in a principled way.  Customs adopted 
CSI’s staged-implementation approach, relegating admission of 
most developing countries to some distant time in the future, 
based on its assessment that “efforts had to begin somewhere, 
and it just made sense to start with the largest volume 
  
for purposes “other than security against an act of terrorism.”  Id. at 35.  For example, 
one small and remote facility that received less than twenty ships per year was 
awarded $180,000 to install security lights; at another port, which stood next to a 
luxury entertainment pavilion, a $25,000 grant was awarded to install video 
surveillance equipment and alarms, a project Department of Homeland Security staff 
concluded “appear[ed] to support a normal course of business.”  Id. at 27, 35-36 
(referenced by Eric Lipton, Audit Faults U.S. for its Spending on Port Defense, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, § 1, at 1).  See also Eric Lipton, In Kentucky Hills, Bonanza, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2006, § 1, at 1 (noting that Kentucky Representative Harold Rogers, 
chairman of the House subcommittee that controls the Homeland Security budget, has 
apparently used his position to benefit his hometown of Corbin, a small, poor, rural 
community in southeastern Kentucky.  Rogers mandated that tamper-resistant 
identification cards that are to be issued to maritime workers be produced in Corbin 
using old technology (used in Corbin), rather than “smart-cards,” which are 
demonstrably superior.). 
 196 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 39, at 22; see also Statement of U.S. Delegate 
Before the GATT Council, supra note 131 (“there is no distinction between developed 
and developing countries in matters of security”). 
 197 Fear—even irrational fear—plays a significant role in public perception of 
the risks of terrorism.  For a discussion of the role of public perception in guiding 
government action in the face of fear and uncertainty, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF 
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 83, 96-97 (2005). 
 198 See, e.g., Statement of Ambassador Deily, supra note 144.  (“It is fully 
recognized that the U.S. economy, as well as the global economy, cannot thrive without 
the expeditious movement of international trade.  These initiatives have been designed 
to identify and carefully screen high-risk cargo shipments while facilitating the 
expeditious movement of legitimate trade.”). 
 199 GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26, at 8.  
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ports.”200  Remembering that CSI was adopted just four months 
after the September 11 attacks,201 Customs’ desire to “do 
something” in the face of such a calamity is perhaps 
understandable.  While such an approach may be 
administratively convenient, and it may have given Americans 
some comfort at a time when fear and the perception of risk 
from terrorist attack was at an unprecedented high, it is far 
from principled.  Thus, in addition to its legal deficiency, CSI 
fails to advance Customs’ own objective of ensuring security 
while “facilitating growth and economic development.”202  
Balancing new security priorities with economic and 
trade objectives is a complicated task given the potential risks 
to human life should the United States underprotect its 
borders.  But in assessing the real risk from maritime 
terrorism, threat assessment cannot be confused with 
vulnerability assessment.  Threat assessment determines the 
probability of a terrorist attack while vulnerability assessment 
evaluates the damage likely to ensue from an attack.203  
Confusing the two could result in a remote possibility being 
deemed an imminent threat.204  In 2000, the Interagency 
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports concluded 
that the threat of terrorism to U.S. seaports was low, although 
vulnerability to terrorist attack was rated high.205  More 
recently, the GAO explored the impetus behind CSI—the fear 
that terrorists may appropriate containers to transport 
weapons of mass destruction or a nuclear device to the United 
States—and concluded it was not an imminent threat.  While 
acknowleging that containerized cargo is vulnerable to some 
form of terrorist action, the GAO report determined:  “[A]n 
extensive body of work . . . by the [FBI] and academic, think 
tank, and business organizations concluded that . . . the 
likelihood of . . . containers [being used to move WMDs to the 
United States] is considered low.”206  The GAO’s finding is no 
  
 200 Customs and Border Protection, CSI Fact Sheet (Mar. 8, 2004), at 3, 
available at http://r0.unctad.org/ttl/docs-unctadxi/csi_5ffactsheet052404.pdf. 
 201 Slide Presentation, supra note 23. 
 202 GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26, at 8. 
 203 Nancy A. Renfroe & Joseph L. Smith, Threat/Vulnerability Assessments 
and Risk Analysis, WHOLE BUILDING DESIGN GUIDE, available at http://www.wbdg.org/ 
design/riskanalysis.php. 
 204 Id.; see also Statement Issued by the International Code Council (“ICC”), 
Maritime Security: Separating Fact from Hype (June 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/print.asp?id=2947. 
 205 Port and Maritime Security Act, supra note 13, at 6.  
 206 GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26, at 5. 
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reason for inaction, but it does suggest there  is time to 
construct measures to protect containers and the supply chain  
that make sense—in other words, measures that adopt a 
principled approach to balancing security, commerce and 
development considerations.   
Redressing CSI’s imbalance and increasing U.S. 
security requires a manifold approach.  The realization that 
much of global insecurity will stem from those countries not 
integrated into globalizations “functioning core,”207 coupled with 
the arrival of a “new terrorism” without borders, points to the 
central role developing countries must play in the fight against 
terror.  Future security measures must consciously and 
explicitly solicit their participation because the United States 
cannot ensure its security without their active engagement.208  
In short, the very status of developing countries as marginal 
participants in the globalization revolution should make them 
“of strategic and political significance” to the United States.209  
What would a more balanced CSI that incorporated a 
development dimension and was designed to address the new 
terrorism look like?   
First, CSI would include technical assistance-capacity 
building as well as development assistance as part of its core 
structure.  Without such assistance, developing countries 
cannot effectively be brought into the security fold.  
Membership in CSI is not without significant financial costs.  
At a minimum, CSI members must invest in state-of-the-art 
equipment and increased training for personnel all along the 
supply chain from customs officials to shippers to 
manufacturers and exporters.210  The costs of required scanning 
equipment range from one to five million dollars, while total 
security-related implementation costs are estimated at 1-3% of 
the value of traded goods.211  Many developing countries would 
not be able to absorb those costs alone; indeed even developed 
  
 207 BARNETT, supra note 192. 
 208 Mikhail Gorbachev’s prophetic statement that we cannot ensure our 
security without ensuring global security highlights the massive shift in the global 
security environment since the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Gorbachev Statement, supra 
note 164. 
 209 See CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9 (language used in Phase II of CSI 
implementation). 
 210 Id.  Of course some countries will already have had the equipment in use. 
 211 Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 186.  Note that the OECD 
suggests a more modest impact.  See OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 50.  
2007] TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 443 
countries like Greece apparently find CSI implementation 
challenging.212   
Admittedly, the idea that a country like the United 
States may have to pay others to ensure its national security 
may be unpalatable to some, but it is surely money well spent.  
Without question, helping ensure the security of developing 
countries’ exports also ensures U.S. security and the security of 
the supply chain.  As one of the biggest providers of 
development and technical assistance aid in the world,213 the 
United States recognizes funding must often be provided to less 
wealthy countries in order to protect and advance U.S. 
interests.214  Moreover, adopting a multilateral approach to 
fighting terrorism would enable the United States to share the 
costs of assisting developing countries with wealthy allies and 
international lending institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund or the World Bank.  In any case, providing 
technical assistance is specifically contemplated in the current 
CSI.  But by the time such assistance is provided in Phase III 
of CSI implementation, it may well be too little too late.   
In addition to funding, many developing countries would 
need a transfer of technology and know-how to effectively 
implement CSI.  Currently, CSI requires participating 
countries to establish and automate certain risk management 
systems to identify potentially high-risk containers, and they 
must also conduct port assessments to identify and resolve 
vulnerable links in a port’s infrastructure.215  Moreover, all CSI 
participants must own non-intrusive inspectional equipment 
(“NII”), which is equipment with gamma or X-ray imaging 
capabilities.216  NII equipment allows officials to inspect a 
container without having to open it, making inspections more 
efficient and less disruptive to the flow of legitimate trade.217  
The United States should grant such equipment to developing 
countries that do not have it, and of course provide the experts 
  
 212 Greece Signs Agreement, supra note 35. 
 213 See U.S. Agency for Int’l Development, Millennium Challenge Account 
Update: Fact Sheet (June 3, 2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/press/ 
releases/2002/fs_mca.html (“The United States is the world’s largest bilateral donor to 
the developing world.  While many donors provide economic assistance, the United 
States provides resources both to strengthen security and foster economic growth.”). 
 214 Indeed, the United States has already provided such assistance with 
respect to Greece.  See Greece Signs Agreement, supra note 35.  
 215 See supra note 32. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
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who can help train local personnel to use them.  There is some 
precedent for such action.  When it sought to protect turtles 
from the nets of shrimp farmers, the United States gave 
Caribbean fishers “turtle exclusion devices” that enabled 
farmers to harvest their product for export while protecting the 
turtles.218  More recently, Customs provided NII equipment to 
Greece in order to bring that country online in time to host the 
2004 Olympics.219  That level of innovative thinking should be 
used immediately on a larger scale to assist developing 
countries in meeting CSI’s security protocols.  
Perhaps the most difficult challenge in constructing a 
more principled approach to CSI implementation is in 
addressing the question of which developing countries should 
be permitted head-of-the-line privileges to join CSI.  By 
relegating admission of developing countries to some time in 
the future—and slowly allowing in some of the more advanced 
and politically powerful developing countries220—Customs has 
not yet had to fully deal with that thorny issue.  It is 
admittedly a difficult one because certain resource constraints 
must be taken into consideration.  CSI implementation is costly 
even for the United States, both in monetary and human 
resource terms.  For each CSI port, Customs must deploy four 
to five officers, computers and related paraphernalia to the 
foreign port.221  Starting with a budget of only $4.3 million in 
2002, CSI has expanded to $126 million in 2005 and about 
$139 million was requested in fiscal year 2006.222  In addition to 
the economic costs, CSI implementation presents formidable 
logistical challenges. As the number of CSI ports increases, 
Customs is finding it more difficult to attract qualified 
personnel to staff overseas posts.223  Currently, thirty CSI ports 
are fully operational with Customs staff in place, but as the 
program expands out to “hardship” posts like Brazil and 
Greece, the expectation is that staffing will become a more 
  
 218 Report of the Panel, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, at 1, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998); unfortunately, U.S. generosity 
was not rewarded in the WTO.  Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 124, ¶¶ 187-88 (Appellate 
Body Report).  
 219 Greece Signs Agreement, supra note 35. 
 220 Business Report, supra note 48 (noting that this came after a South 
African official’s comment that CSI could pose challenge to WTO rules). 
 221 GAO REPORT 2003, supra note 27, at 12-13. 
 222 See GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26, at 9; GAO REPORT 2003, supra 
note 27, at 13.  
 223 See GAO REPORT 2003, supra note 27, at 28.  
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difficult issue.224  These costs limit how quickly CSI can expand 
and—potentially—which countries can be included.  But these 
resources constraints must be handled in a way that does not 
undermine security or penalize developing countries 
themselves.   
It is of course impossible to construct a list of developing 
countries that under all circumstances should be incorporated 
in CSI and future security measures.  But it is possible to 
develop a set of parameters for admission that do not rely 
exclusively on a country’s economic status.  In the first 
instance, those countries that have the requisite equipment in 
place should not be denied admission.  Thus, developing 
countries like Jamaica, Malaysia and South Africa, now part of 
CSI, would have been granted admission much earlier.225  
Another concern with CSI’s current implementation 
strategy is that on certain continents, a single country is 
privileged.  In Africa, for example, South Africa is the only 
country with a CSI port, and until recently, South America had 
no ports at all.226  One response is to ensure that on every 
continent at least five to ten developing countries be 
incorporated in CSI.  The criterion for admission cannot be 
based principally on whether a country has “substantial” trade 
with the United States,227 or at least the term must be loosely 
defined.  What might be considered de minimis trade by U.S. 
standards could well be the economic life-blood of a developing 
country.   
Finally, the question arises whether certain conditions 
should be imposed on developing countries in return for 
admission to CSI.  “Conditionalities” are often imposed in 
World Bank or IMF lending, as well as in preference programs 
developed by wealthy nations to benefit developing countries.228  
  
 224 Id. 
 225 Jamaica became a CSI member in 2006—years after CSI had been 
established.  Malaysia joined in March 2004, and South Africa in February 2003.  See 
Ports in CSI, supra note 31. 
 226 CSI Fact Sheet supra note 9, at 1. 
 227 One of CSI’s admission criteria is that a country have “regular, direct and 
substantial” container trade with the United States.  Id. at 3. 
 228 AGOA, for example, sets certain conditions for membership, adding only 
those countries that: 
have established, or are making continual progress toward establishing the 
following: market-based economies; the rule of law and political pluralism; 
elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; protection of intellectual 
property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing 
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It is a popular way for those providing the funding to ensure 
their resources are being properly utilized.  Much of the 
rationale behind conditionalities—protecting against 
corruption and waste—would presumably (and hopefully) not 
be at issue here given that improper implementation of CSI 
would expose developing countries themselves to terrorist 
attack.  
CSI itself imposes certain conditions—such as having 
the requisite equipment and risk assessment capabilities229—
that would be non-controversial if applied to all members.  But 
one could imagine other conditions that would elicit 
controversy; for example, what if the United States were to 
require as a condition for admission that a developing country 
agree to launch trade facilitation negotiations within the WTO?  
Conditions that go to the heart of the proper implementation of 
CSI, including possible audits to ensure that monies are being 
well-spent, make some sense and could be developed in a way 
that does not unduly trample on the sovereignty rights of 
developing countries.  Conditions that are only tangentially 
related to CSI implementation, however, would likely force 
developing countries to rebel.  To the extent possible, CSI 
admission should not be used as a tool to advance other 
interests.  U.S. security interests—as well as the interests of 
the supply chain—are too important to be exposed to 
traditional “pork-barrel” politics.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Terrorism was not invented on September 11, 2001.  
But when the Towers came tumbling down, it signaled the 
arrival of a new form of terrorism and a shift in globalization.230  
The “new terrorism” is one that is highly mobile, 
technologically advanced, unfettered by state control, and 
profoundly lethal.  In turn, the new terrorism revealed a need 
to re-conceptualize the link between globalization and security.  
Before September 11, discussions of that link tended to focus 
on the breakdown of domestic control that occurred when 
  
availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of human 
rights and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labor practices. 
H.R. 434, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 229 CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 3. 
 230 For a provocative discussion of the nexus between globalization and 
terrorism, see BARNETT, supra note 192. 
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protestors took to the streets during international meetings to 
demonstrate against the ever-encroaching tide of 
globalization.231  But September 11 demonstrated that security 
and globalization are interrelated.232  Terrorists fly a plane into 
the World Trade Center, and along with the damage to lives 
and property come border closings, which threaten whole 
industries because in a just-in-time world, American 
enterprises cannot prosper without inputs from businesses 
around the world.  This interrelationship of security, commerce 
and globalization has moved the lowly shipping container to 
the frontline in the War on Terror.   
In an effort to protect the advances made possible by 
globalization, shipping containers—which facilitate the 
interconnection of countries—must be protected.  Given the 
challenges terrorism poses to the system, U.S. action is not 
surprising; indeed, action is necessary.  The WTO Agreement is 
not an impediment to taking such action, but it does impose 
certain obligations.  One of those obligations is the need to 
balance security considerations with development objectives.  
The United States cannot ensure its security at the expense of 
further impoverishing economically vulnerable countries.  Such 
a course of action, in the end, would only make the terrorists’ 
objectives that much easier to attain. 
Before September 11, the debate in trade and 
development circles centered on proponents of “free trade” 
versus those who advocated “fair trade.”  But in the current 
security environment, secure trade adds another dimension to 
the debate.  A stable and prosperous trading system will only 
be achieved when all three elements—free, fair and secure—
are incorporated within an expanded trade regime. 
  
 231 See, e.g., Paul Reynolds, Eyewitness: The Battle of Seattle, BBC NEWS, Dec. 
2, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/547581.stm.  The high-watermark for the 
anti-globalization protestors was, of course, the WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference in 
1999.  When the conference ended, without the long-awaited launching of a new round 
of negotiations, the antiglobalists claimed victory. 
 232 Ironically, while the terrorists were in part protesting a globalization 
phenomenon that leaves much of the Middle East behind, their mission could not have 
succeeded without the advances in telecommunications and other technologies that 
globalization made possible.  See, e.g., Kurt M. Campbell, Globalization’s First War, 
WASH. QUARTERLY, Winter 2002, at 10-11.   
